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THE DUMBARTON OAKS PROPOSALS

BY ERICH HULA

THE Dumbarton Oaks proposals for the establishment of a general international organization are not yet the definite charter of the future world organization. In strictly legal terms they are a tentative agreement between the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China which lays the foundations of the future organization. Preparation of its final charter is the task of the conference at San Francisco, convened for April 25th, of representatives of all the United Nations, small and large alike. It can be taken for granted that the structure that will ultimately emerge from the general conference will not in all details resemble the structure agreed upon by the four great powers at Dumbarton Oaks. The criticism of the scheme by the governments of the middle and small states will have to be met by somehow blunting its hegemonic edges.

It is less likely, however, that any such changes will affect the substance of the scheme so far agreed upon, and therefore the following analysis is based on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals in their original form. In this discussion I shall disregard the economic and social functions which those proposals assign to the future world organization, and shall confine myself to an analysis of political purposes and agencies.

I

Throughout human history periods of devastating wars have been productive of great designs, intended to redeem mankind once and for all from the curse of bloody, ruinous strife by devising a more just and more stable international order. We have seen a recurrence of this pathetic effort during the present worldwide struggle. Particularly in this country, an ever-widening stream of well-meaning projects for permanent peace began to pour

forth shortly after the outbreak of the war. As was to be expected, most of them were too perfect to fit the stubborn realities of the world in which we live. If we hope to do justice to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, we should therefore avoid measuring them by the standards of maximum schemes which testify to the laudable intentions of their authors rather than to their political awareness. The framers of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals had to face the imperious necessities of international politics, and deal with them on the level of actual circumstances.

We are fully justified, however, in comparing the Dumbarton Oaks plan with what are to all practical intents and purposes minimum schemes of international organization. Therefore in the following pages I shall repeatedly refer to two instruments of this kind, the Covenant of the League of Nations, and what can be called the American Design for a charter of the general international organization. As regards the latter, some words of explanation seem desirable. The American Design is not an official draft, in the sense that it would ever have been presented as such to the American public. It grew out of the deliberations of a private group of American and Canadian experts on international affairs which was constituted early in 1942 and arrived at a community of views late in 1943. The content of this agreement was revised in 1944 by a smaller group, consisting exclusively of Americans. Though the history of Dumbarton Oaks has not yet been written, we are on safe ground in assuming that this revised draft, published in August 1944, formed the basis of the suggestions which the American delegates submitted at Dumbarton Oaks to their British, Russian and Chinese colleagues. In wording as well as in structure the Dumbarton Oaks proposals closely resemble that American Design, though there are certain striking and very interesting differences between the two documents.

The Dumbarton Oaks organization is to be a comprehensive and permanent association of the nations of the world. Membership will be open to "all peaceloving states." Actually the

original members will be the states represented at the San Francisco conference, but other states may be admitted later on. The Big Three have made it clear that at San Francisco only those states will qualify for original membership which were by March 1, 1945, at least formally participating in the present war on the side of the United Nations. This explains the recent rush into the ranks of the United Nations by states that had hitherto failed to declare war on the Axis powers. In fact, "The United Nations" is to be the very title of the organization set up at the San Francisco conference. Later admittance will have to be granted by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.

It can be safely assumed that the present enemy countries will be admitted, if at all, only after a period of probation. The situation is somewhat more complex as regards the states that remain neutral throughout the present war. Russia's abstention from the International Air Conference at Chicago last December, and the official reasons given for it, forbode a reluctant attitude on the part of at least the Security Council to admit the neutral states without insisting on further conditions than proof of their peaceful intentions. Nor is it certain that the neutrals themselves will all be ready to join the organization, even if they are put under the pressure which the Dumbarton Oaks proposals envisage for such an eventuality. It may thus be some time before the organization develops into a truly universal association.

But from its first day it is to be a permanent organization, in the sense that voluntary withdrawal from it will not be legally permissible. Once a member of the organization, a state is bound to remain a member for good. The proposals empower the General Assembly, upon recommendation of the Security Council, to suspend a member from the exercise of any rights or privileges of membership, and even to expel it, but unlike the Covenant of the League of Nations they do not authorize any member to leave the organization at its own volition. This permanency of membership in the United Nations is a radical

deviation from practically all precedents in the history of modern international organization. It is the more noteworthy as only the big powers are assured the right of absolute veto against constitutional amendments.

Also precedent-breaking are the broad powers assigned to the general international organization, or more precisely, to its Security Council. In regard to both the settlement of disputes and the prevention and repression of war, the powers of the Security Council far surpass the powers of the League of Nations organs, at least in relation to the minor members of the organization.

The wide range of powers is particularly conspicuous in the provisions on the pacific settlement of disputes. Unlike the League Covenant, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals stipulate an absolute prohibition of war. The charter is to bind all members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the organization. Legally the threat or use of force is to be the monopoly of the organization. This absolute prohibition of individual wars means that all members are obliged to settle their disputes by peaceful means, in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered. Member states are free only as to the methods by which they try to achieve the peaceful settlement.

If the parties to a dispute fail to settle it by "negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice," they are bound to refer it to the Security Council. If the Council is of the opinion that "the continuance of the particular dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security," it is empowered to settle the matter by its own decision. And the Security Council need not wait until a dispute is referred to it, for it is empowered to assume jurisdiction on its own initiative at any stage of a dispute. Under the League of Nations Covenant the parties to a dispute were not bound to accept the

terms of settlement even if the latter were unanimously agreed upon by all members of the Council other than the disputants themselves. Under the Dumbarton Oaks plan the disputants are obliged to accept and carry out even a majority decision of the Security Council, though in relation to a great power the terms of settlement are not enforceable.

The political implications of these provisions will become fully clear only when we discuss the voting procedure. But even in the present context we should consider briefly what the Dumbarton Oaks proposals have to say about the rules and principles by which the Security Council is legally bound in establishing the substantial terms of settlement.

The proposals stipulate that in discharging this function the Security Council should act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the organization. The purposes of the organization are the maintenance of peace and the maintenance of security. What are its principles? The Dumbarton Oaks recommendations do enumerate the principles in accordance with which the organization and its members should pursue its purposes. But the fact of the matter is that all these principles, with the possible exception of one, merely circumscribe and underline the obligations of the member states to comply with the decisions of the Security Council. They do not lay down rules or standards to be complied with by the Council. The preamble to the League of Nations Covenant referred to the "firm establishment of the understandings of international law," the "maintenance of justice" and a "scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations" as means of promoting international peace and security. No less emphatically does the American Design insist on the supremacy of international law. But in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals we seek in vain for any reference to international law and justice. It is certainly true that solemn reference to the prescriptions of law and justice does not in itself assure their actual observance. But what we are concerned about in this context is that the Dumbarton Oaks plan purposely refrains from declaring the maintenance of legal

and moral standards to be one of the conditions of maintaining peace.

That in stressing this omission I am not overemphasizing legal niceties is proved by the omission of still another and much more important clause of the League Covenant. In fact, we are here face to face with the basic philosophy of Dumbarton Oaks.

Article x of the League Covenant obligated the members of the League to respect *and preserve* from external aggression the territorial integrity and political independence of all members. This collective guarantee of the members' territory and independence against external aggression was highly problematic from a practical point of view. Both the decision whether a case for guarantee had actually arisen and the decision on the measures to be undertaken against such aggression were left to the discretion of the individual members. Under Article x the Council was empowered only to advise upon the means by which these obligations should be fulfilled. Still, the article contributed greatly to the defeat of the Covenant in the United States Senate, the principal argument of its opponents being that it implied a guarantee by the United States of the status quo all over the world. To be sure, the no less famous Article xix of the League Covenant tried to introduce a dynamic element into international relations by authorizing the Assembly to recommend from time to time a revision of treaties and other procedures of peaceful change. But the fact remains that the Covenant leaned toward a static conception of international law. In view of the role played by Article x of the League Covenant in the discussions of the Senate some twenty-five years ago, it can be taken for granted that the American delegates to Dumbarton Oaks were as little eager as the other delegates to insert into the proposals a guarantee clause of worldwide scope. On the contrary, they agreed that the door should be left open for peaceful change of existing territorial and political conditions, if and when the maintenance of those conditions should prove to endanger the preservation of international peace.

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals make provision for the establishment of an International Court of Justice to replace the present Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. At the same time, however, they clearly indicate a distinct preference for the political rather than the judicial settlement even of disputes that by their very nature lend themselves to decision by a court. International conflicts concerning the territorial integrity and political independence of a state are generally considered to be of a non-justiciable character. Thus it is only consistent that in the Dumbarton Oaks plan their settlement falls under the jurisdiction of the Security Council. Being a political body, the Council will be inclined to decide such issues in conformity with considerations of political expediency rather than of international law. It will be particularly inclined in that direction when a disregard of international law is the sole price at which international peace can be maintained. In other words, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals mean the legalization of settlements in contradiction to the law whenever the ratio of the disputants' physical strength suggests and warrants such a solution as the only possible means of avoiding an armed conflict among the great powers of this world.

This is borne out by the proposals' intentional failure to limit the arbitral authority of the Security Council by a code of substantive principles, including a guarantee of the territorial integrity and political independence of the members of the so-called security organization. The proposals concerning the settlement of international disputes are a set of rules of procedure, but they do not recognize inalienable rights of the member states which the Security Council would be bound to respect in settling a dispute. Thus the Dumbarton Oaks plan, in contrast to the League of Nations Covenant, leans toward a dynamic conception of international relations. The full degree to which this fact lessens the actual security value of the organization for the small states will become evident only when we discuss the voting procedure of the Security Council.

In brief, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals lay the main emphasis on the enforcement of peace rather than on the enforcement of law. The more important, therefore, is the question to what extent they assure the effectiveness of the organization in dealing with an actual or potential aggressor state, and thus enable it to accomplish its principal purpose. This brings us to a discussion of the powers entrusted to the Security Council for the prevention and repression of war.

As indicated above, these powers, too, are in a sense much broader than those that were assigned to the League of Nations Council. They are also more flexible, and the greater flexibility of action makes for greater stress on the prevention than on the repression of war. It is true that the League Covenant did not altogether neglect preventive intervention by the League agencies. But the terms of the Covenant lend themselves to controversial interpretations, which made it difficult to strike a reasonable balance between the preventive and the repressive conceptions. Moreover, according to Article xvi of the Covenant, coercive measures, whether in the form of economic sanctions or of military sanctions, could be applied only against a member actually resorting to war in disregard of the provisions contained in the Covenant.

Under the Dumbarton Oaks plan no uncertainty can ever arise as to the *right* of the Security Council to interfere at any time with the external affairs of member states whose actions are in the considered opinion of the Council a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression." In deciding whether it should interest itself in the matter, the Security Council is not bound by any definition of actions that constitute a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or aggression. Also, it is completely free to enjoin on such member states the taking of certain specified measures in order to eliminate the dangers to the maintenance of peace. And finally, it is empowered to apply coercive measures, including military measures, whenever it considers such sanctions indispensable as a thwart to aggressive intentions. Not

alone an actual resort to force, but even a threat to use force warrants the taking of coercive measures by the Council.

These rules mean not only that would-be aggressors are subject to further restrictions than those imposed upon them by the League Covenant but also that the members of the organization which is to enforce the peace are given greater responsibilities. But these responsibilities are far from unlimited. In this case the conferees of Dumbarton Oaks have taken great pains to define and circumscribe clearly the authority of the Security Council.

The role of the Security Council in relation to coercive collective measures is, unlike the role of the League Council, of a directing and not of a merely coordinating character. As regards diplomatic, economic, financial and commercial sanctions against the potential or actual aggressor state, the members are obligated to comply with any decision that the Security Council finds appropriate to the particular situation. Constitutional processes in the several states are not allowed to stand in the way of enforcing at short notice the diplomatic and economic measures determined by the Council. Thus Congress would have to confer in advance a blanket authority on the President to enforce such decisions of the Council. The latter is free to exempt states from participating in these sanctions, but no state is entitled to such an exemption.

The Dumbarton Oaks plan tries also to assure adequate and prompt action by military measures, if peace can be maintained or restored only by such extreme means. In precommitting the members of the organization to the use of military force it goes much less far, however, than it does in precommitting them to follow the Council's decisions on other sanctions. As a matter of fact, the charter as such is not to contain any specifically military stipulations. The Dumbarton Oaks plan merely directs the member states to conclude among themselves special agreements, to be approved by the Security Council, whereby the Council will be supplied with strictly limited forces. These agreements will provide for two types of armed forces. The first

type is national air force contingents for combined international enforcement action, to be kept immediately available by the parties to the agreements. The second type is armed forces and other military facilities which the parties will undertake to make available to the Security Council whenever the latter calls upon them to assist it in maintaining or restoring peace. Thus the plan does not provide for the establishment of an international police force, but contents itself with the provision of contingents to be supplied by the national armies in accordance with these special agreements. The latter are to be ratified by the signatory states "in accordance with their constitutional processes."

In invoking military action the Security Council may insist upon the cooperation of all members of the organization, but it is free to call upon only some of them. It will be assisted and advised in such action by the Military Staff Committee, which is responsible under the Security Council for the unified strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the Council's disposal. The Military Staff Committee will consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the great powers and, if need be, of other associated members representing the minor powers. Only the Chiefs of Staff representing the great powers will have the right to vote.

This does not mean that the Security Council will not be entitled to ask for military support by the members of the organization beyond the limits set by the special agreements, if it should prove that the forces at the disposal of the Council are not fully effective for maintaining or restoring international peace. It means only that the military precommitments of the members are definitely limited. The conferees of Dumbarton Oaks wanted to make it absolutely clear that collective military measures involving the use of additional forces would be dependent upon the free discretion of the member states. The special agreements are to obligate the members of the organization to participate in police actions of a limited range. It is up to them to decide whether they will cooperate with the Security Council in military actions of a warlike character.

It is a safe guess that this provision, too, is primarily due to the insistence of the American delegates at Dumbarton Oaks. It clearly meets in the most satisfactory way the issues arising in this connection under the American constitution, which reserves to Congress the right to declare war, and authorizes the President only to the lesser uses of force in international relations.

From a strictly technical point of view, it may be said, in short, that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals satisfy the conditions of effectiveness in peace machinery to a higher degree than did the League of Nations Covenant. This does not imply, of course, that they satisfy those conditions to a sufficient degree. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that they go far toward assuring promptness and unity of action against an aggression of minor scope; they do put teeth into the Covenant.

II

But the greater effectiveness of the present apparatus of peace enforcement does not in itself mean a greater certainty that there will actually be a decision to use it when there is need for it. In fact, the flexible character of the Dumbarton Oaks provisions is a twosided matter. It means that the Security Council is only *empowered* to take collective measures. Its powers are permissive, not mandatory. It is hardly a mere accident that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals speak of the right of the Security Council to take military actions, whereas the League Covenant speaks of the duty of the Council to recommend military sanctions to the members concerned.

The probability that the Security Council will act to settle international disputes and to prevent and repress war depends ultimately upon the rights and duties which the Dumbarton Oaks plan assigns to the individual members of the organization. Therefore it is necessary now to consider those provisions of the plan which define the legal status of the several members.

This question's significance for the fate that awaits the San Francisco treaty in the United States Senate can hardly be over-

rated. In 1920 the League of Nations was wrecked in the Senate by the charge that it was a superstate, although none of the provisions of the Covenant warranted such a charge. Because of its comparatively broad powers the Security Council of the Dumbarton Oaks organization will come closer to a world government than any other international body in recent history. How then may it be possible this time to meet the charge of superstate?

The question turns on the problem in what sense, if any, and to what extent the Dumbarton Oaks proposals are actually intended to establish an organization that would hold superior powers over the governments of its member states; for we would be entitled to speak of a world government or a superstate only if any of the agencies of the United Nations organization were empowered to take actions independently of the governments of the respective members, and without their previous approval in each case.

A close analysis of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals shows that the general international organization is to hold such independent powers only as regards the medium and small member states. The great member states, including the United States of America, retain their discretion concerning any collective actions to be taken by the organization. In other words, the Security Council through which the Dumbarton Oaks organization will exercise its arbitral and its security functions will have a dual character: within its sphere of jurisdiction it will be a governmental body in relation to the lesser members, and a merely coordinating agency in relation to the great powers.

There is no denying that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals group the member states into two classes of different legal status, although Chapter II of the plan proclaims the principle of "sovereign equality" as the very basis of the organization. To be sure, the equality of states, understood as their equal capacity for rights, has become generally recognized only in comparatively recent times. Moreover, the League Covenant, too, by legalizing the actual inequality of great and small states, through its pro-

visions on the composition of the Council, contravened to a certain extent the idea of the legal equality of states. But though the small states did not have equal representation on the League Council, the vote of those that were members of the Council carried legally as much weight as the vote of the big fellows. Decisions of the Council required, generally speaking, a unanimous vote of the members. Besides, under the Covenant the Assembly, in which every member of the League was equally represented, held by and large concurrent powers with the Council. In these respects the Dumbarton Oaks organization will differ fundamentally from the League of Nations. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the proposals mean a reversal of the direction into which the family of nations seemed to move until recently.

The only agency in whose deliberations and decisions all the members of the organization will participate on a footing of complete equality is the General Assembly. That body will elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the members of the Economic and Social Council, and, upon recommendation of the Security Council, the Secretary-General of the organization. The General Assembly will approve the budgets of the organization, and decide on the proportion to be borne by each member. Generally speaking, the Assembly is to control the organization's activities. Important decisions of the General Assembly, including its electoral functions, will be made by a two-thirds majority, all other decisions by a simple majority vote.

The functions of control assigned to the General Assembly do not, however, include actions on peace and war. All that it is authorized to do for the maintenance of international peace and security is to make recommendations. In fact, it is not even allowed to make on its own initiative any recommendations concerning a matter that is pending before the Security Council. Under the Covenant of the League of Nations the Assembly and Council held concurrent powers, but the Security Council has an absolute monopoly in all matters relating to the maintenance

of international peace and security. It is this monopolistic position of the Council which magnifies the importance of the provisions concerning its composition and procedure.

The Security Council is to consist of five permanent and six non-permanent members. The permanent seats are assigned to the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France and China. The non-permanent members are to be elected by the General Assembly for a term of two years, and they are not to be immediately eligible for reelection. Thus the composition of the Security Council is clearly based on the idea that power should go with responsibility. At least the principal responsibility for maintaining peace will rest with the militarily, economically and financially strongest states. Their permanent representation in the organization's executive council, which is to hold the key to war and peace, is therefore, in practice, indispensable. In this respect the Dumbarton Oaks proposals merely follow the precedent set by the League of Nations Covenant, which otherwise scrupulously adhered to the principle of equality among its members.

As a matter of fact, neither the expediency nor the justice of the distinction between permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council is seriously contested. What is being criticized is rather the concrete application of this distinction. It is more than doubtful whether all the five states that are assigned permanent seats are actually, not merely potentially, great powers. Moreover, if power and responsibility are to be proportionate, it seems plausible that the middle states, too, should be granted a special position, perhaps in the form of semi-permanent membership in the Security Council; the Netherlands, Canada, Brazil and certain other countries can rightly claim a military, financial and economic strength far superior to that of such states as Costa Rica, Nicaragua or Albania. And is not the total of six non-permanent members too small to provide for a fairly adequate representation of middle and small states alike? Finally, one may wonder whether the provisions on the

composition of the Security Council should not be made more flexible. As they stand today, any change regarding either the status or the number of its members would require a constitutional amendment, which in order to become effective would have to be ratified by each of the five privileged members of the Council.

The privileged position of the great powers is due not only to the permanency of their tenure and the hegemonic structure of the Security Council. Equally if not even more important are the voting privileges granted them under the procedural rules of the Dumbarton Oaks plan. The vote of a great power is not only actually but also legally to carry more weight than the vote of a middle or a small state represented on the Council. We touch here upon the much discussed veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council.

Under the Covenant of Geneva, decisions of the Assembly or Council required the agreement of all the members of the League of Nations represented at the meeting. This unanimity rule of the League was in conformity with the then prevailing idea of the equality of all states, as well as with the usual procedural practice of the main organs of other international organizations. But it could not fail to weaken considerably the efficiency of the League machinery, particularly in security matters. The authors of the Dumbarton Oaks plan therefore agreed that the future security organization should be strengthened by application of the majority principle to the decisions of all its agencies. Departure from the unanimity rule was facilitated by the fact that in many fields a distinct trend away from it has been evident in international development between the two world wars, and especially during the present war.

Acceptance of the majority principle for the decisions of the Security Council brought the delegates of Dumbarton Oaks face to face, however, with the same crucial question which many times before in history has challenged the wit of the builders of confederate or federative organizations. For an example we

need only remember the discussions of the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, concerning proportional or equal voting in Congress. Because of the entirely different nature of the United Nations organization and its specific purpose, it is hardly surprising that some kind of proportional voting was at Dumbarton Oaks a foregone conclusion. Small as the total number of the lesser states represented on the Security Council may be, they nevertheless hold a majority of six to five. It would be preposterous to allow the Security Council to form a decision involving coercive actions without making sure that at least some of the great powers that are strong enough to enforce those measures are ready to back up such a decision.

Contrary to a widely held belief, the American delegation was not altogether opposed to granting voting privileges to the Council's permanent members. As a matter of fact, the American Design went so far as to recommend that in *all* agencies of the general international organization the majority should in some cases be required to include the votes of the states continuously represented in what the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were to call the Security Council. The obstructive controversy of Dumbarton Oaks turned exclusively on the question whether a great power which is itself charged with aggression should forfeit its right to vote. The Russians insisted on the absolute great-power veto, the Americans and British wished to see it qualified.

The Yalta compromise establishes three different categories of decisions of the Security Council, to which different voting rules are to be applied.

To the first category belong all decisions on purely procedural matters. These are carried if they are made by an affirmative vote of seven out of the eleven members of the Council. This means that a great power—indeed, several of them at once—may be outvoted on procedural matters.

The second category comprises decisions of the Council taken in the exercise of its arbitral functions in the settlement of international disputes. In these cases parties to the dispute have

to abstain from voting, even if they hold a permanent seat in the Council. Decisions on such matters are carried if they are made by an affirmative vote of at least seven members, provided the seven or more votes include the concurring votes of the permanent members other than the parties to the dispute.

The third category comprises all other possible decisions, in particular the determination by the Council of the existence of a threat to peace or a breach of the peace and decisions on coercive measures of any kind. All decisions of this type are carried only if made by at least seven members, including the concurrent votes of *all* the five permanent members. In other words, the fact that a great power is itself charged with aggression does not disqualify it from voting on and vetoing any decision of this third type: a great power can veto any enforcement action directed against itself.

The Yalta compromise thus incorporates what is not quite correctly called the absolute veto of the great powers. But it incorporates it in a somewhat mitigated form. To be sure, a great power can prevent the Security Council from invoking physical force, or even from ordering diplomatic or economic sanctions. But no great power that is a party to a dispute can prevent the Council from investigating the dispute and proposing a settlement. If charged with aggression, a great power would at least have to state its case at the bar of public opinion.

The lack of universal coercive power in the supposedly universal peace organization is a shock to the believers in an integral collective security system. But it is legitimate to ask whether a right of the Security Council to take coercive measures against one of the great powers would not be a merely fictitious right. Coercive measures against Great Britain, or Russia, or the United States would mean, in effect, total, worldwide war. No state, large or small, can reasonably be expected to take such measures unless it considers its vital interests to be at stake. Neither can it be presumed that the United States would risk a war against Russia to prevent the latter, let us say, from annexing Rumania,

nor that Russia would go to war against Great Britain or the United States to prevent aggressive actions on their part in matters not touching upon Russia's vital interests.

The voting procedure in the Security Council is no doubt open to many more or less well founded objections. But the plan should definitely refute any unqualified charge that the world organization constitutes a super-government which would deprive the United States of her freedom of decision on war and peace. The voting privilege of the great powers legally precludes coercive actions by the Security Council against any of the great powers, including the United States. It is to the honor of this country, and speaks for its peaceful intentions, that in spite of this advantage it was opposed to the absolute veto. But the fact remains that the absolute veto, once adopted, enlarges the discretion of the American government. More important, in actual practice, is the fact that under the voting rules the United States cannot be compelled to participate against her will in collective coercive actions against another state. Any such measure would require the assent of the American representative in the Security Council, who will act under the instructions of the President. Measures of a warlike scope would have to be previously endorsed by a formal declaration of war by Congress.

Thus by joining the Dumbarton Oaks organization the United States would not forfeit her sovereign right to decide for herself on war and peace. All she would obligate herself to do would be to cooperate with the other members of the organization in maintaining or restoring international peace, a task from which she could not shrink anyway, unless she would again gravely neglect her own interests. As regards the great powers, including the United States, the Dumbarton Oaks organization is nothing but institutionalized international cooperation—machinery for the coordination of collective measures voluntarily agreed upon by the five powers.

Things are different in regard to the middle and small states. For them the security value of the organization is likely to be

diminished by the very provision that assures freedom of action to the great powers: because of the latter's voting privilege, the smaller states cannot be certain of obtaining the organization's support against even an attack by another medium or small state, not to speak of an attack launched against them by a big fellow. And at the same time a medium or small state is bound to participate in collective coercive measures invoked by a body in which it may not even be represented. Canada and the other Dominions would thus find themselves in the strange position of being subordinated to the Council of the general international organization, while at the same time enjoying a status of complete independence and equality within the supposedly closer framework of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

But it is only fair to add that no great power, either, can count on receiving coercive action from the organization against another great power. Nor can a permanent member rely, in any matter, on absolutely certain action by the Security Council. Finally, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals are clearly intended to assign to the privileged members of the organization not only greater rights but also greater responsibilities. We should therefore suspend judgment on the relative positions of the great, middle and small states until we know, from the special agreements still to be concluded among the members of the organization, to what extent their rights and duties are truly proportionate.

III

The small states are greatly interested in still another question. Is the Security Council, under the terms of Dumbarton Oaks, authorized to interfere also in the internal affairs of the member states? The proposals contain only one direct reference to this question, and this reference would seem to indicate that any such intervention is precluded. According to this provision the arbitral powers of the Security Council will not apply to situations or disputes arising out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the states concerned.

In any concrete case it is the Security Council itself, however, which will have to decide whether a matter pertains to municipal or to international law. Moreover, the Council's right to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace," and to take appropriate countermeasures against any such threat, would easily lend itself as a legal basis for any kind of interference by the Council, even with the internal affairs of the member states. As a matter of fact, Joseph C. Grew, Under-Secretary of State, is reported to have stated on March 3 that the Dumbarton Oaks plan contemplates "suppression of revolutions that might bring international war." By the same reasoning it would have to be added that the plan might also operate to encourage revolutions.

Be that as it may, intervention by the Security Council with the internal affairs of member states would demand the concurrent affirmative vote of all the great powers plus two votes of non-permanent members of the Council. In view of the conflicting political philosophies of the states concerned, it is not very likely that such a majority vote could easily be reached.

This contrast in the basic political beliefs of the five powers may prove to be the greatest liability of the organization. It has already led to the inability of the Dumbarton Oaks conferees to agree on common principles that would direct the relations between governments and their respective citizens. The membership of the organization will range from states which cherish the traditions of government by law, down to states in which the relation between government and opposition is determined by conceptions approximating the rules of absolute, unlimited warfare. A common interventionist policy by the Security Council would therefore be no simple thing to achieve.

This still leaves untouched, however, the problem of interference by one great power with the internal affairs of its smaller neighbors, serving not the interests of the organization as a whole but the particular interest of the one particular state. It leaves untouched the problem of a surreptitious interventionist policy by one great power against the will of the other powers, great

and small alike. The chances that such a policy will be pursued depend greatly on the answer to another question of tremendous political importance, which is not yet definitely settled by the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

As the plan stands now, primary responsibility for the settlement of disputes and for the prevention and repression of war is assigned to the Security Council, as the central authority of the organization. The present discussion is based, in fact, on the assumption of this alignment of responsibility. But the plan does not altogether exclude a far-reaching delegation of authority by the Security Council to regional agencies. Indeed, the Conference of Mexico City, and in particular the Act of Chapultepec, point in the direction of a final solution that would go rather far in stressing the regional as against the universal conception. Needless to say, a decision in favor of a highly decentralized security organization would approximate the system of spheres of influence. This could not fail to have, among other important effects, a bearing on the question to what extent the great powers will be able to turn their small neighbors into satellites.

One short word about another possibility that seems to be in the shaping. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals strongly suggest that the enforcement of the peace terms to be imposed on defeated Germany and Japan should not be entrusted to the Security Council of the world organization, but should be the concern of the great powers alone. Senator Vandenberg's plan points in the same direction. This solution would relieve the incipient organization of a tremendous responsibility.

It would corroborate, on the other hand, the interpretation that the future international organization will be founded on the hegemonic conception of a worldwide Concert of Powers. But unlike the European Concert of Powers in the nineteenth century, it will be closely tied up with a more or less representative organization of the minor states. It will be a combination of a World Concert of Powers and a League of Nations.

The builders of a world organization face the problem which

is the very central problem of politics. To put it in the words of Abraham Lincoln, how can we establish a government which is not too strong for the liberties of the people, but strong enough to maintain itself? Only the future can prove whether and to what extent the conferees of Dumbarton Oaks have succeeded in laying the foundations of a structure which will be able to avoid arbitrariness as well as weakness—the two dangers inherent in any political system. It would be useless to deny that both dangers loom on the horizon. Certain features of the structure can be said to invite an abuse of power. But no less real is the danger of weakness. The Dumbarton Oaks plan stands or falls, politically as well as legally, with the unanimity of the five great powers. If this nucleus falls apart, the whole edifice will crumble to the ground.

WAR AIMS IN POLITICAL WARFARE¹

BY HANS SPEIER

I

A REALISTIC discussion of the use of war aims in political warfare perhaps starts best from a clear understanding of the fact that propagandists do not make foreign policy; they talk about it. They inform the world about the policy of the country for which they speak. They interpret this policy. They translate its meaning into language that will be understood by people who are not experts on foreign policy. They point up its successes and conceal its failures. And they try to disparage the foreign policy of the enemy.

The propagandist enjoys more freedom when he informs his audience than when he interprets. He has the least freedom when he needs it most. His interpretations have to stay within narrow limits and are, as a matter of routine, subject to clearance by policymaking agencies. Sometimes the use of a single word or the translation of a phrase must be approved beforehand. This situation prevails in all countries at war.

Because the propagandist depends on the policymaker, effective liaison between their agencies is of great importance in political warfare. But liaison between the statesmen and the top personnel responsible for propaganda is not institutionalized in any country. Unlike experts in foreign, military and naval affairs, experts in propaganda are seldom among the participants at international conferences. In fact, the more important the parley, the less likely it is that there will be propagandists among the attending advisers.

There is nothing wrong with this arrangement. Propaganda campaigns are neither so important nor so final as military campaigns, and the plans of men experienced in foreign policy, while

¹ Text of an address delivered at the New School for Social Research on March 4, 1945, at a Discussion Evening conducted by the Institute of World Affairs.

less final than the plans of the military, anticipate results far more important than the results the propagandist may hope to achieve. For this reason the worst propaganda schemes are usually less harmful than moderately bad designs of statesmen.

The cooperation between the statesman and the propagandist can in some regards be compared with the relations between a husband who wants to save and a wife who likes to spend. Propagandists are usually inclined toward short-range considerations. A policy that is focused on enduring interests, future conditions and long-range objectives may restrict the propagandist's daily operations, and when this happens the propagandist has to comply. He complies, but is sometimes dissatisfied. The sense of frustration that he feels may be caused by the prudence of the statesman, but the training that is most valuable in the work of a propagandist is no education for appreciating political prudence.

War aims are integrally related to foreign policy. To the extent that foreign policy is public it becomes part of the ammunition to be used in political warfare against the enemy. The propagandist wants to talk about war aims primarily in order to precipitate victory or to delay defeat. If the war is going well for his side, the propagandist, like the general, wants to shorten it. Statesmen have the same objective, provided that shortening the war does not conflict with the more important aim of obtaining a desirable peace. Should such a conflict arise, the statesmen may decide to do what Richelieu did during the Thirty Years War and what neither generals nor propagandists can be expected to do on their own initiative: they may subordinate the objective of shortening the war to that of obtaining a more desirable peace.

II

The most obvious aim of war is victory. As Mr. Churchill once remarked: "You asked, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however hard and long the road may be . . ." ² This is a

² House of Commons, May 13, 1940.

clear statement. It ought to be remembered at every discussion on war aims in times of war. At the same time, Mr. Churchill's answer is a definition of war aims merely in terms of war, and one that holds true for all possible war aims in very many, if not all, wars of the past and the future. It does not tell us what the victor will do with his victory, and in particular what he will do with the vanquished. But nothing less than that is what we mean by war aims as distinguished from declarations of a strong determination to conquer.

What, then, is the function of war aims in the wider sense of the term? Obviously, they give a political meaning to the war. If they are defined by great statesmen they help to clarify the minds of lesser men; they are meant to strengthen, or at least not to impair, your will to fight, and to weaken the enemy's will to fight you back.

War aims affect the expectations of the enemy. They may influence his political calculations; they may reduce or intensify his fears and raise or stifle his hopes regarding the consequences of defeat. The way in which war aims are defined and used depends on the nature of the war.

In certain circumstances war aims are addressed to the enemy government, and state the political sacrifice it will have to make if it decides to discontinue the struggle. In this case war aims are used in order to attain a triumph of diplomacy over war. They enable the enemy to compare the cost of defeat or a renunciation of victory with the cost of delaying or preventing defeat. The enemy is expected to reason about the issue of peace.

Despite the state of war and despite the normal wartime expectation of enemy ruses, a measure of common understanding and mutual trust must exist even in the noise of battle, if war aims are to be employed in this manner. In order to induce the enemy government to reason about the issue of peace it must be not only politically desirable but also socially possible to sit down with the enemy and talk peace. Obviously, such a situation does not prevail in absolute wars. Genghis Khan did not state

war aims. He always began his campaigns with the ominous warning, "We know not what will happen; God knows," and ended them with the wholesale slaughter of men, women and children. A triumph of diplomacy over war is possible when there is a balance of power in international politics—when wars are waged to gain a relative advantage within the balance rather than for the sake of upsetting it. In such circumstances the status of the enemy as an enemy is a temporary one, and war aims are means of persuading him to resume his role as a partner or associate in a balanced system of power.

One of the most striking illustrations of the triumph of diplomacy over war was the peace that ended the Thirty Years War. The triumph was great because it was slow in coming. Diplomats got together in Münster and Osnabrück—towns that had not suffered too much from the ravages of war and were declared neutral. After having agreed on how many wars were raging at the time, the diplomats began to talk and write about agreeable terms of peace, gauging the remaining wealth and prestige of each country by the display of its diplomats, and using the outcome of the lustily continuing battles as bargaining points in the negotiations. Seven years after the Preliminary Articles for the Universal Peace Conference had been drawn up, the diplomats concluded the Peace of Westphalia.³

In modern times the triumph of diplomacy over war is perhaps even more elusive, because of the participation of large masses of the population in the military and political conduct of wars. On the other hand, precisely this situation increases the importance of political warfare. War aims may appeal over the head of the government to the people, a course adopted by French statesmen in the French Revolutionary wars, by Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk and by Woodrow Wilson. In this case your war aims are addressed to certain parts of the enemy nation in an effort to induce them to overthrow their government in your interest or,

³ For a brief description of the negotiations see R. B. Mowat, *A History of European Diplomacy 1451-1789* (New York 1928) pp. 104 ff.

if they cannot do this, at least to further your interest by disloyalty to their government. If your interest coincides with the larger interest of mankind, it will be useful to stress this fact, because it lends the strength of universality to your appeal. If it does not so coincide, it will be good strategy to pretend that it does, because the enemy cannot be expected to act only in your interest. Such revolutionary war aims are most effective if they split the enemy by convincing a part of the enemy nation that it has a common interest with mankind at large, rather than with you, against the enemy government. The enemy government must appear contemptible, criminal and, in any case, no longer acceptable as a partner in diplomatic negotiations.

The temptation to adopt such a revolutionary course waxes with the moral indignation about the enemy government, and wanes with aversions to civil disorder. It also grows when the chances of defeating the enemy without the help of treason in his country are slim. Finally, revolutionary war aims may recommend themselves by other incidental advantages. For example, at the time of the Lusitania crisis in 1915 Colonel House advised President Wilson to place the responsibility for war between Germany and the United States, if it became inevitable, upon the German emperor and his military clique, and to make it clear that the United States was fighting for the liberation of the German people as well as for the liberation of Europe. Colonel House saw an incidental advantage of this policy in its good effect upon the German-Americans.⁴

Regardless of the nature of war and the use to which war aims are put, the task of defining them in the best possible way appears rather easy, if it is assumed that they are defined merely for the purpose of political warfare. It is in the interest of political warfare to have the country's statesmen talk a soft peace while its generals wage a hard war, but it does not matter to the propagandist whether the statesmen talk a soft peace because they

⁴ See *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, arranged by Charles Seymour, vol. 2 (New York 1926) p. 466.

sincerely believe in it or because they merely want to trick the enemy into believing in a soft peace while he is still fighting.

If one assumes that war aims are defined merely for the purposes of political warfare, it is difficult to understand why statesmen are sometimes reticent on war aims or why they do not always talk soft peace in times of war. For this reason there will always be people who, though they have no axe to grind, are very insistent that their government ought to adopt less severe or more specific war aims.

The lack of resounding British war aims at the beginning of the war in Europe was often criticized in Britain. Many men in public life, including members of the House, tried to get the British government to talk soft peace. In February 1941, for example, a motion before the House of Commons called for a debate on peace terms, which would include among other things "provision of food to Continental nations . . . ; opportunities for the German and Italian people to choose for themselves whatever form of self-government they think fit . . . ; the removal of unemployment, undernourishment, bad housing and the lack of educational opportunities so that all races and creeds may live together in peace, liberty and security, enjoying the good things of life, both spiritual and physical and rendering service in return." Mr. Churchill replied: "The terms of the Motion standing in the name of my honorable Friend illustrate the very large measure of comprehension of British peace aims which prevails in this country and elsewhere. I do not think there is the slightest need for a Debate on this subject at present."⁵

Or take the more recent case of Senator Wheeler, in this country, attacking the severity of the demand for unconditional surrender and advocating in its stead encouragement of a democratic German government in order to shorten the war. Mr. Stettinius, reaffirming the policy of unconditional surrender, replied

⁵ Both statements quoted from *Peace Aims*, British Official Statements, A Chronological Record, from September 2, 1939, to September 24, 1941 (British Information Service) pp. 18-19.

promptly that the Senator spoke for a small and discredited minority.

In totalitarian countries there are only official war aims. In democratic countries there are official war aims, unofficial war aims, unofficial opinions on official war aims, unofficial war aims of prominent individuals and groups, polls on unofficial war aims and polls on polls. Unofficial aims and opinions can be used in political warfare against the enemy if they support the foreign policy of the government. In this case they help to create the impression abroad that the nation is united behind its government. If unofficial war aims are more severe than official aims, they are used by the enemy in his domestic counterpropaganda to negate the possible effect of official war aims. If they are less severe than official aims or if they openly reflect enemy propaganda, they are not quoted by the enemy, as their only advantage to him is that they may impede the domestic war efforts of his opponents.

The same holds true of secret war aims, official or not, which leak out to the public. A case in point is the publication in 1917 of the secret treaty promising to Italy certain territories in return for her participation in the first World War. Similarly, the recent discussion of the so-called Morgenthau plan in the American press gave more ammunition to Dr. Goebbels than was foreseen by the American journalists who availed themselves of the leak. If they had foreseen it, they would have kept quiet.

The American, Theodore N. Kaufmann, who in 1941 advocated the sterilization of 48 million male Germans, is very well known in Germany;⁶ but the Germans do not know that many

⁶ On Theodore N. Kaufmann's book, *Germany Must Perish*, see my remark in *Social Research*, vol. 8 (September 1941) p. 325: "The book is so violent that it might have been written in the German propaganda ministry in order to launch a really successful anti-American hate campaign in Germany." In the meantime a collection of excerpts from the book, together with slanted passages from speeches by President Roosevelt, has sold several million copies in Germany. Wolfgang Diewerge, the compiler of this collection, has had a brilliant career in the propaganda ministry. See Ernst Kris, Hans Speier and Associates, *German Radio Propaganda*, Studies of the Institute of World Affairs (New York 1944) pp. 485-86.

of the main aims of Nazi propaganda are openly pursued in certain German language papers in this country, such as the *Wanderer*, the *Detroit Abendpost* or the *Abendpost Chicago*; nor do they know that certain English language newspapers follow a similar editorial policy. One may be sure, however, that the German government is well informed about these facts.

If one looks more closely at responsible domestic criticism of official war aims, and at the reasons for its rejection by responsible statesmen, one does not necessarily find that the critics are always wrong and the statesmen unfailingly right. One will notice, however, that war aims are defined not only for the purposes of political warfare but for many other purposes as well. These purposes often conflict with those of political warfare. Statesmen in times of war cannot with impunity afford to be angels of peace merely for the sake of propagandists, or to be cynics in the guise of angels. There are too many disillusioned people in this world who distrust angels, and too many moralists unwilling to forgive cynics. Nor is it possible for statesmen to speak to the enemy without being overheard by others.

III

The weapons used in political warfare differ in many respects from the arms employed in military fighting. They hit widely different targets at the same time. A politically important statement may aim at one particular group, say the enemy government, but will reach at the same time other groups as well, for example the neutrals or the domestic critics of the man who made the statement. The statement may also miss the intended target altogether and reach only others instead. There is no fire in political warfare without the possibility of backfire, no percussion without its repercussion, and duds sometimes blast the wits out of the gunner. All this deprives the laws of political warfare of the imposing simplicity of ballistics.

Statements on foreign policy are meant to influence, in different directions, various audiences with different predispositions. At

home a declaration of war aims must brace national unity in such a way as to further the war effort. Instead of giving useful arguments to the opposition it must manoeuvre the opposition into a place where it cannot show its displeasure about the government's leadership without discrediting itself.

The same war aims must serve the function of pleasing neutrals or of intimidating them—as the case may be—in order to strengthen one's own cause, materially and morally.

War aims must meet with the approval of allies as well, especially of those allies who might want to conclude a separate peace. War aims must give the impression that the unity in fighting the common enemy is buttressed by a measure of common understanding about the desirable state of international affairs at the end of the war. Fighting a common enemy creates a stronger bond among friends than do endeavors which lack this reminder of the usefulness of cooperation. But to look ahead with confidence to a constellation of postwar interests that will admit of cooperation and compromise is to acquire an additional incentive to fight the war without reservations. The different objectives based on this constellation of interests need not form a pattern of harmony, but if they do, this pattern can easily be marred by demands that it include the means of reducing enemy fears and raising enemy hopes. Thus it is difficult to define war aims satisfactorily, and it is possibly dangerous to follow the advice of propagandists.

Wars of coalition, with attendant differences in national interest and tradition among the allies, present especially noteworthy obstacles to the definition of war aims. These obstacles do not exist in wars waged without powerful associates.

Marshal Stalin once remarked: "It would be ridiculous to deny the difference in ideologies and social systems of the countries composing the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. But does this preclude the possibility and expediency of joint action on the part of the members of this coalition against the common enemy who threatens to enslave them? It certainly does not preclude

it. More, the existence of this threat imperatively imposes the necessity of joint action upon the members of this coalition . . .”⁷ Undoubtedly Stalin was right. But the speech in which he stressed the necessity of joint action against the common enemy contained also his famous statement on the future of the German army: Stalin declared it “not only impossible . . . but also inadvisable” to destroy all organized military force in Germany.⁸ At that time there was, in the coalition against Germany, unity regarding the war aim of victory over Germany but flagrant disagreement on the war aim of German disarmament.

By the time of the Moscow Conference, about a year later, disagreement on this particular war aim seemed to have vanished. The old aim was now voiced only by captured German officers in Soviet Russia, who expressed their gratitude to the Soviet authorities for enabling them to convene according to Article 129 of the Soviet Constitution. This article grants the right of asylum to those who wage a war of national liberation. The Union of German Officers and the older and larger organization, “National Committee ‘Free Germany,’” amply contributed to nationalistic anti-Hitler propaganda from Russian soil. Official Russian policy, however, underwent a change. At the Yalta Conference the leaders of the three major powers were united in their determination “to destroy German militarism and Nazism . . . to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production.”

The intentions of Marshal Stalin’s earlier policy are obscure. It is possible that he was merely waging political war against Germany, with the intention of weakening the loyalty of German military chiefs to their leader. It is also possible that Stalin engaged in “a propaganda maneuver . . . designed to hurry up

⁷ November 6, 1942. Quoted from *Soviet War Documents*, Embassy of the USSR, Washington, D. C., Information Bulletin, Special Supplement (December 1943) p. 39.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

the too leisurely effort of the British and Americans to create a 'second front.' " ⁹ Finally, it is possible, and indeed likely, that the statement had both purposes—that it was intended both to weaken the German war effort and to warn Russia's allies.

On other occasions statements on war aims have been used for encouraging rather than warning friends. The two most important instances in modern history are President Wilson's Fourteen Points and the Cairo Declaration.

President Wilson's speech before Congress on January 8, 1918, in which the Fourteen Points were enunciated, was not only a declaration of American policy but also a bold and futile attempt to keep Russia in the political camp of the coalition against the Central Powers at a time when she was about to conclude peace with Germany. Wilson introduced the Fourteen Points by a long statement on Russia. "The voice of the Russian people," he said, called for "these definitions of principle and purpose." The sixth of the Fourteen Points dealt with "The evacuation of all Russian Territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their goodwill, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy."

Wilson's attempt failed, despite the energetic efforts of the Creel Committee in Petrograd to give wide publicity to the speech. The German authorities were in a position to impose their peace upon Russia. It deprived the country of 89 percent of its coal mines, 54 percent of its industrial enterprises, 32 per-

⁹ Carl L. Becker, *How New Will the Better World Be?* (New York 1944) p. 196.

cent of its agricultural land, and 34 percent of its population; also it cut Russia off from the Black Sea and almost from the Baltic Sea as well.

The Cairo Conference of November 1943 is another noteworthy instance of the use of war aims for cementing alliances. President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek declared jointly that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." American comment was very favorable. Barnet Nover spoke of "an act of faith and a gesture of friendship . . . in view of China's present weakness."¹⁰ Few observers discussed the question to what extent obliging our Chinese ally would further or impede our political warfare operations against Japan. Hanson W. Baldwin warned, however, that the declaration would increase Japan's will to fight and was "likely to be more of a handicap than a help to our Pacific war."¹¹

Let us consider this instance for a moment. Let us assume that an expert in our political warfare against Japan had been present at Cairo and had agreed with Mr. Baldwin. When this expert was shown the draft of the declaration ought he to have been in the position to advise against it on the grounds that he expected it to create difficulties in his political warfare operations against Japan? Obviously his advice could be taken seriously only if he had arrived at his decision after consulting his colleagues on China and other Japanese-occupied areas in the Far East. Let us disregard the fact that they would have violently disagreed with him. Let us concede that it would not have been harmful and that it would have been possible to consult, concerning the declaration, with a group of experts in matters of political warfare.

It certainly would have been folly to base a decision on their advice, for the political perspective of propagandists is exceed-

¹⁰ *Washington Post*, December 4, 1943.

¹¹ *New York Times*, December 4, 1943.

ingly short. As experts in political warfare they would not have taken account of the traditions of our foreign policy in the Far East, the lasting interests of this country, the political relations, both at that time and after the defeat of Japan, between Britain and the United States, China and the United States, Russia and the United States. In short, the data and the considerations on which they would have based their advice would have been grotesquely inadequate in view of the great political issues that were affected by the declaration. Statesmen, not propagandists, must make policy. Historians may yet tell us that one of the reasons for Hitler's failure as a statesman was his being too much of a propagandist.

IV

The fact that this war is a war of coalition cannot possibly be overlooked in studying the history of political warfare against Germany. The most important and probably the most effective aim in political warfare against Germany has been the liberation of the countries overpowered by the Nazis, and the restoration of sovereign rights to those peoples who were forcibly deprived of them. Without this aim there would not be any United Nations. As early as September 20, 1939, this aim was stated by Neville Chamberlain. It was repeated by Churchill after the fall of France and after the fall of Yugoslavia and Greece. The list of countries to whose liberation Britain was pledged had grown long. There can be little doubt that British, and later American and Russian, determination to liberate the subjugated countries was a most important reason for Germany's complete failure to rally Europe behind her idea of a New Order.

The desire of Britain and the United States to restore sovereign rights to the enslaved peoples of Europe was restated in the Atlantic Charter, to which the Soviet Union declared her adherence on September 24, 1941, at the conference of the Allied governments in London. This war aim has again been restated in the Declaration on Liberated Peoples, which is part of the

Report on the Crimea Conference. On the other side of the globe, the repeated solemn pledges to restore the freedom of the Filipinos and to establish and protect their independence have served a similar purpose.

Regard for allies, or for prospective allies, was also the reason for the reticence of British leaders on war aims other than liberation, during the period preceding the Atlantic Charter. Considerations of this kind were naturally much more urgent than any intensification of Britain's political warfare against Germany by the announcement of more specific war aims. When Churchill spoke about the Atlantic Charter in the House of Commons on September 9, 1941, he made this unmistakably clear: "I have, as the House knows, hitherto consistently deprecated the formulation of peace aims or war aims—however you put it—by His Majesty's Government, at this stage. I deprecate it at this time, when the end of the war is not in sight, when the conflict sways to and fro with alternating fortunes and when conditions and associations at the end of the war are unforeseeable. But a Joint Declaration by Great Britain and the United States is an event of a totally different nature."¹²

Perhaps the most important instance of the influence of coalition warfare upon the definition of war aims is the demand for unconditional surrender.

The principle is not a new one in American history, not even in wars with Germany. It was advocated by Senator Lodge, Theodore Roosevelt and very many other critics of President Wilson's policy of 1918, both in this country and in Europe. On October 7, 1918, Colonel House, commenting on Wilson's difficulties in replying to the German plea for an armistice, remarked that Wilson did not seem to realize the nearly unanimous sentiment in this country against anything but unconditional surrender.

If the assumption is correct that generals surrender more easily when their honor or at least their face is spared, the formula of

¹² *Peace Aims* (cited above) p. 26.

unconditional surrender is clearly of little value in political warfare. If one demands unconditional surrender one must expect determined resistance as an answer. Thus from the point of view of political warfare it would appear sensible to speak of unconditional surrender when enemy resistance is definitely broken, but until that moment to hide one's intention to demand unconditional surrender. But the demand for unconditional surrender was made public at Casablanca in January 1943. There may therefore have been reasons for its publication which outweighed its apparent disadvantages to the conduct of political warfare.

Various reasons have been advanced for the insistence on the principle, perhaps the most interesting one by Mr. Churchill on May 24, 1944. "That principle," said Churchill, "wipes away all ideas of anything like Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points being brought up by the Germans after their defeat, claiming they surrendered in consideration of those Fourteen Points."¹³

I find it difficult to see the merit of this argument. It is true that between the two world wars the Germans were past masters in distorting the meaning of the Fourteen Points, their contribution to Germany's military defeat and their relation to the Treaty of Versailles.¹⁴ The Germans displayed considerable skill in mendacity, both in creating a legend that they had not been defeated on the field of battle and in breeding hatred of the western democracies. But I submit that Germany's unconditional surrender will not in itself prevent the Germans from indulging once more in such pernicious flights of fancy. The foundations for various new legends have already been laid by Hitler and other Germans who have blamed Italian treachery, the treachery of German generals, and various other treacheries for what in German propaganda is known as "the crises" or "the trials" of this war. It will not be difficult for the Germans to connect such

¹³ Quoted from text published in *New York Times*, May 25, 1944.

¹⁴ See Harry R. Rudin, *Armistice 1918* (New Haven 1944) and Lindley Fraser, *Germany Between Two Wars. A Study of Propaganda and War Guilt* (New York 1945).

alleged treacheries with alleged Allied bribery and satanic designs, and then we would have the new legend.

To illustrate, on September 11, 1944, the Berlin correspondent of *Aftonbladet* quoted an article by Dr. Ley in *Der Angriff* as follows: "The grave military and political reverses are entirely due to treachery, which reached its climax with the attempt on Hitler's life. The German forces were never defeated during the last World War, but were betrayed by reactionary politicians. Without internal and external treachery we would have settled the enemy long ago. The African, Sicilian and Italian campaigns were one series of acts of treachery. We would have conquered Egypt, Suez and the Near East if our Italian Allies had done their duty. All the prerequisites existed, but were destroyed by Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio, who foiled the efforts of the Italian Army and Navy. The treachery of the Badoglio troops was noticeable also in the Eastern front. North of Stalingrad they caused the Stalingrad catastrophe, and thus a series of defeats from Stalingrad to the Vistula was started by men like Generals Höppner and von Treskow."¹⁵

Insistence before victory on unconditional surrender and its long-range political effects will be no substitute for measures that may have to be taken to prevent the rise of new legends in Germany after her defeat. Nor does it appear reasonable to me to suppose that the Allied conquerors will be less hated this time for defeating, occupying and disarming Germany than they were last time for considerably less drastic measures.

It is possible, however, that the political and military situation which prevailed in this war of coalition at the time of Casablanca influenced President Roosevelt's decision to issue a statement on unconditional surrender as early as January 1943. Those were the days of the smashing Russian victory at Stalingrad. Almost a year and a half had to pass before a Second Front was established—a year and a half of an almost uninterrupted series of Russian

¹⁵ For Hitler's leading contribution to this legend in his speech of September 10, 1943, see Kris, Speier and Associates, *op. cit.*, pp. 276 ff.

victories. The men and women in the occupied countries who were resisting Nazism were hoping for a Second Front. Uninformed public opinion in this country and Britain had followed Stalin's lead in relentless propaganda for an earlier establishment of a Second Front. The political arrangements accompanying the landing in North Africa had not created the impression that the United States would refuse to conclude other deals in Europe if they should become militarily advantageous. There may also have been ignorant people abroad who doubted in January 1943 the determination of this country not to falter until Germany was finally defeated—not to change its policy in any circumstances, including the election of a new president in the fall of 1944.

No evidence is available that considerations of this kind actually played a part in formulating the demand for unconditional surrender, but obviously the demand was a heavy political bomb thrown onto the battlefields in Europe, where very many Russians but no American or British soldiers were dying at the time. Mr. Churchill went on record with a statement that the strong words "unconditional surrender" were put forth by President Roosevelt and endorsed by him, Churchill, "in days of our comparative weakness and lack of success."¹⁶

Nor should it be forgotten that only a little more than two months before the Casablanca Conference Stalin had reiterated war aims which betrayed a disquieting concern for German militarists, in the event they turned anti-Nazi. I have already quoted Stalin's statement on this issue. It was in line with earlier official Russian statements which favored revolutionary war aims during the long initial period of German victories in Russia. The day Russian soil was invaded Molotov had said in a radio address: "This war has been forced upon us not by the German workers, peasants and intellectuals, whose sufferings we well understand, but by the clique of bloodthirsty fascist rulers of Germany."

¹⁶ In his speech of January 18, 1945, quoted from *New York Times*, January 19, 1945.

Stalin repeatedly spoke in the same vein. For example, on July 3, 1941, he said: "In this great war we shall have loyal allies in the peoples of Europe and America, including the German people, who are enslaved by the Hitlerite despots."

The formula of unconditional surrender which Stalin adopted with a slight modification in his Order of the Day of May 1, 1943, cleared the political atmosphere. In wars of coalition it is always easier to agree on negative war aims than it is to reach an understanding on affirmative ones.

In Allied propaganda to Germany the demand for unconditional surrender is treated as follows.

First, it is repeated and stressed as the main message of the United Nations to Germany today. I am inclined to think that its effect upon Germans must have been particularly great early in 1943, when no Second Front existed as yet, when the American air offensive against the German war economy had not yet out-distanced the German blitz against Britain, and when Germans had been thoroughly indoctrinated by Dr. Goebbels to believe that this time the bragging Americans would be too slow and too much preoccupied in the Pacific for making their power felt in Europe.

Second, unconditional surrender is presented as the end of misery and destruction and death, which the German people suffer in consequence of the policy of their government. It is presented also as the only alternative to more misery and destruction and death on German soil, if the Germans continue a war which everybody in his senses knows to be lost by the German armed forces.

Third, it is made clear that unconditional surrender entails the destruction of Nazism from which the German people suffer: the end of Gestapo persecution and Nazi lawlessness. Unconditional surrender is the prerequisite of the punishment of the men who have committed indescribable crimes all over Europe and in Germany herself.

Fourth, it is made clear that unconditional surrender does not

mean the destruction of the German people or their enslavement. President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill have clearly and repeatedly stated that the unconditional surrender of the vanquished does not relieve the victors of their obligations to humanity and their duties as Christians. Freed of the burden of arms, the German people will be able to earn their way back into the comity of nations. There are probably few nations in Europe better prepared than the Germans to understand that there are imperative duties to which no rights correspond.

v

Allied statesmen have not talked soft peace during this war. Is there any evidence that softer war aims, if this expression may be used, would have shortened the war? In order to answer this question it is necessary to distinguish clearly between those Germans who hold power and those who do not. Obviously, it would have been possible to shorten the war by concluding a compromise peace with the German government in the second period of this war. As long as Germany's military position was favorable, the German government would not have been willing to conclude a compromise peace, because, naturally, it wanted something better than that: a victor's peace. When Germany's military situation deteriorated the German government would probably have consented to a compromise peace, since it would have meant political victory and personal escape from punishment for the chief criminals in the German government.

There is a lesson to be learned from the response to Wilson's Fourteen Points in Germany during the last war. Those Germans who hold power during this war not only have tried to ridicule the Atlantic Charter but also warned before the conferences at Teheran and Yalta that another "Wilsonian swindle" was in the offing. By "Wilsonian swindle" they meant any statements by Allied leaders offering to the German people anything less than destruction, enslavement and physical annihilation after the defeat of the German armed forces.

It is difficult to decide whether the German leaders have fallen victim to their own legend about Wilson and his Fourteen Points or whether they have merely used anti-peace propaganda for whatever it is worth, in order to support by words the physical terror exercised against those Germans who have become weary of war.

In any case, large masses of the German people during the first World War understood Wilson to mean that peace was unobtainable as long as Germany was ruled by men who in their domestic policy were reactionary and in their foreign policy imperialistic. These masses and their leaders had no power. They could not prevent the imperialistic peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest which Germany imposed upon Russia and Rumania respectively. Nor did they succeed in overthrowing the government before Germany was decisively defeated on the field of battle.

The men who held power in Germany during the first World War hoped to win a victory which would strengthen Germany's military and economic situation by aggrandizement in the West and in the East. Ludendorff's war aims were oriented toward the requirements of a new war.¹⁷ When Germany's military situation deteriorated, it became evident that the German Supreme Command had no clear idea of the "fateful conditions" which, according to Prince Max von Baden, were outlined in Wilson's Fourteen Points.¹⁸ The request for an armistice was forced upon Prince Max by Ludendorff when he realized that the war was lost. Ludendorff was in a hurry to obtain an armistice. The high pressure methods which he used against the reluctant Prince Max did not include the argument that an appeal to the Fourteen Points should be made.

The most interesting reference to the Fourteen Points, from a military source, was made almost three months before Luden-

¹⁷ See the official inquiry by the German Reichstag into the causes of Germany's defeat, *Die Ursachen des deutschen Zusammenbruchs*, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Berlin 1925) pp. 106 ff.

¹⁸ See Lindley Fraser, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

dorff urged Prince Max to end the war, by Major Alfred Niemann in a memorandum of July 20, 1918. This memorandum was approved by Ludendorff and earned the author a position of special trust in the Kaiser's entourage. It read in part: "Use Wilson's idea of a League of Nations through the mediation of a neutral state, not for the purpose of realizing this utopian scheme but in order to begin negotiations. The slogan that an end must be made to the massacre of peoples possessing highly valued cultures appeals to most nations. Wilson's hypocrisy must become a means of entrapping him."¹⁹

When the first German note was dispatched to Lansing, early in October 1918, Walther Rathenau, a man later murdered by German fanatics, opposed it publicly and criticized the harshness of the Fourteen Points. He felt in particular that Point Six, dealing with the evacuation of Russia, was tantamount to unconditional surrender.

It would be difficult to maintain that the men who rule Germany in this war are more reasonable than Ludendorff or Tirpitz. The men who do not hold power in Germany today may be more reasonable than Hitler, and perhaps even more reasonable than Rathenau was in October 1918. But they do not hold power. In fact, it is much more difficult for them to seize power than it was for the powerless opponents to the reactionaries and imperialists during the first World War.

Still, the argument has been advanced that it might have been possible for an anti-Nazi opposition in this war to overthrow the Nazi regime if the United Nations had indicated their willingness to grant a better peace to a German government formed by anti-Nazis. In view of the terroristic nature of the Nazi regime, which renders a seizure of power difficult—war aims or not—only the German army could conceivably overthrow the Nazi rule. Thus the decisive issue centers around the status to be granted to the German army. Better terms than unconditional surrender would have had to include, as a minimum, discussion with the enemy

¹⁹ Quoted in Appendix to *Ursachen* . . . (cited above).

with arms in his hands. At this price, too, the war could possibly have been shortened, since many German generals must have known for quite a while that they have not succeeded in their attempts to realize Hitler's plans of conquest.

In brief, it appears that "softer war aims" might have shortened this war if a more compromising policy had been adopted either toward the leaders of the National Socialist party or toward the leaders of German militarism. It is difficult to conceive that anything but compelling military reasons, which do not exist, could speak for such a policy.

The nature of this war, determined, as it is, by German aggression; the nature of the coalition which Germany has mobilized against herself for a second time in a generation; the respective national contributions to the defeat of Germany by the forces allied against her—all these factors have gone into the making of our war aims.

VI

In wars that last long it often happens that the constellation of interests which prevails at the beginning undergoes a change as other vital interests become involved during the war. Germany began this war with her rear protected by a treaty with Russia. She is ending it with the desperate prophecy that her defeat by Russia and the western democracies means the Bolshevization of Europe.

"Of course," Goebbels said on February 1, 1945, "it is correct that we fight for our life in this war, but it cannot be disputed that our life is the nucleus of Europe's life, and the husk would drop off and fall to the ground if the kernel were to wither away. By refusing to recognize these facts the political bourgeoisie is inviting its downfall. How many more proofs are needed to corroborate the prognosis, after almost the whole of eastern Europe and southeastern Europe have started on the path to hell for lack of political instinct . . . Historical facts have allotted to the Reich the role of natural leader on the Continent, for

better or worse. The Continent draws its life from our strength, and our impotence and our downfall would cause it to sink defenseless to the ground."

Thus, according to Goebbels, it shows a lack of political instinct to wage war against Germany and to defeat her. Toward the end of the last war Colonel Häften, with the approval of Ludendorff, suggested an anti-Bolshevist propaganda campaign to support the failing German arms. In this war the German government has been convinced ever since Stalingrad that its last and only hope lies in splitting the United Nations and in turning the western democracies away from and against Soviet Russia. Ever since Stalingrad the insistent cry of German propaganda has been, "Change your enemy or you are lost!"

After the last war the importance of war aims in political warfare was much overrated, especially by the Germans. After this war we may be led to conclude that war aims and the foreign policies of the great powers behind them are of importance primarily in affecting the duration of the peace to come. At the present stage of the war one may indeed say that the duration of the peace depends upon the foresight, articulateness and compatibility of the foreign policies of the great powers.

It must be remembered that the official war aims of the United Nations reflect an agreement among nations whose foreign policies do not coincide, and that the interests of these nations cannot all be reconciled without difficulty, unrelenting effort and willingness to make compromises.

In this war, which transcends any possible European balance of power system and in which no attempt has been made to persuade the enemy to become a partner in peace talks, the total defeat of Germany is an aim, an end. Soon, however, that defeat will be a new fact in the constellation of national interests within which great and small powers will pursue their policies. Similarly, liberation of the countries temporarily subjugated by Germany is a common war aim of the United Nations, but after this end has been attained it becomes apparent that liberation from

the fear of Nazi rule is not identical with liberation from want. Continuing want is partly a result of Nazi exploitation and war, and partly a consequence of our global strategy. For logistic and other reasons freedom from want in Europe presupposes victory in the Far East. Political and economic life in Europe is likely to be hard and bitter for perhaps years to come.

The noblest aim of nations at war is to gain through victory the right to determine the course of history. Let us hope that the statesmen of the victorious nations will show prudence, and will act with remembrance of the men and women who gave their lives for peace when their nations were united against their common enemy.

FOOD SUPPLY UNDER A PROGRAM OF FREEDOM FROM WANT¹

BY JOHN LINDBERG

THE purpose of this paper is to consider certain implications of a program of freedom from want of food. It does not aim at predicting the future, but it attempts to indicate the nature and approximate magnitude of forces that would be released by policies intended to lift food standards everywhere to levels recognized as adequate in the advanced countries. The conclusions as to the long-term prospects of food supplies may appear pessimistic. It should be understood, however, that these conclusions are relevant only under conditions that may have little bearing on the immediate future. Overproduction and want may coexist for generations. Such circumstances as improved methods of production, impediments to international trade, and lack of purchasing power in the underconsumption areas may necessitate postwar controls of production and trade in the staple foods.

In the following pages potential food requirements and potential food supply will be considered separately. The former depends on per capita requirements and on the size of the population, and both of these factors are treated at some length; the discussion of supply is necessarily more summary.

Food Requirements of Present Populations

Freedom from want of food does not mean freedom simply from starvation. It implies diets that supply, in addition to the neces-

¹ I wish to express my deep gratitude to many persons for friendly advice and criticism. I mention in particular: Messrs. Ansgar Rosenborg and Folke Hilgerdt of the Economic Department of the League of Nations, Mr. F. L. McDougall, Economic Adviser to the Australian government, Professors R. B. Warren and W. W. Riefner of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. My special thanks are due to Professor Frank W. Notestein, who has given me the benefit of his advice in spite of some difference in emphasis. For the opinions expressed in this paper, and its shortcomings, I alone am responsible.

sary amount of calories, the nutritive elements required for growth and the maintenance of health and efficiency. During the inter-war period advances in nutritional science made it possible to formulate authoritative scales indicating, by way of "recommended allowances," human requirements of different food elements. Such scales, while differing in detail, are in substantial agreement as to essentials, and have become the goals toward which both national and international nutrition movements aim.

It is true that some ambiguity remains as to the meaning of "adequate diets." Because of the rapid and continuous progress of science, the scales are provisional and subject to change. They were laid down in a period when food seemed abundant, if not superabundant, and are liberal in comparison with demonstrated need and actual diets. They are in the nature of broad averages, and were based chiefly on conditions prevailing in the more advanced western nations. Thus the recommended diets are expensive in terms of land and resources. Economically, they are out of reach for most of mankind. It is possible, and even likely, that further progress in nutrition, coupled with more intensive study of differential requirements, may lead to the construction of diets which, while nutritionally "adequate," may require less land and fewer resources in their production.

Meanwhile, however, the existing scales represent the consensus of medical authorities. Hence, while it is a matter of opinion whether the "recommended allowances" are unduly liberal, or perhaps wasteful, they must be accepted at the present time as the targets toward which a policy of freedom from want is aiming. And as for differences in the qualitative requirements for food in accordance with such factors as stature, race, climate, occupation, we have no reason to assume that such differences exist, even though factors of this kind do influence the quantity of food needed or particular foodstuffs preferred. In other words, until proof to the contrary is forthcoming, we are compelled to consider the qualitative dietary requirements, if not definitive, at least universally valid.

We know that national diets high enough to meet accepted dietary standards are found in only a few countries, situated chiefly in North America and northwestern Europe. Even in these areas maldistribution of food results in some malnutrition in particular population groups. In most countries national diets are deficient in all or most respects, and only a minority can afford adequate food. A universal policy of freedom from want of food must aim at raising the diets of the majority to a level corresponding to that of the minority.

The majority of diets are based on cereals and root crops. These staple foods hold their position in virtue of cheapness: cheapness in terms of money and cheapness in terms of resources needed in their production. Taste and tradition mean something, but family budget inquiries show that people everywhere prefer to eat less of the staple foods and more of the quality foods when income permits. As the economic choice widens, people consume more sugar, fruits, vegetables, meat, milk, milk products and eggs. Except for sugar, fruits and vegetables, the preferred foods are generally of animal origin.² People tend of their own accord to eat more of the protective foods, and where national diets are adequate, this condition has been achieved almost entirely by free consumers' choice. With higher income, and thus with better nutritional standards, people consume more calories of animal and fewer calories of vegetable origin. Indeed, the balance between animal and vegetable calories in the human diet—what may be called the *animal-vegetable ratio*—is perhaps the most significant single index of dietary levels.

In countries that have adequate national diets the animal-vegetable ratio is approximately 40:60. This does not mean that adequate diets could not be constructed on the basis of a somewhat lower animal proportion, or that a higher one would be

² Because of their low calorie content fruits and vegetables (other than root crops) are not an important source of calories in the diet, though they are important as sources of minerals and vitamins. Sugar, though nutritionally poorer than the other staple foods, is consumed mainly for reasons of taste, and is generally used in conjunction with other foods like fruit.

harmful. It does suggest, however, that the exercise of free consumers' choice leads to adequate diets at about this level. Whether free consumers' choice, if economic conditions permitted, would lead everywhere to a similar balance it is impossible to know. Tastes, habits, religious beliefs and similar factors may and do influence choice to a considerable degree. But in the absence of concrete evidence it seems justifiable to assume that adequate diets would on the whole lead to approximately this ratio.³ In the present context there is probably no practical interest in a discussion of the savings that would be possible if governments were to abolish free choice of food and impose the cheapest possible diets consistent with what is regarded at present as adequate nutrition.

Animal food is indirectly derived from vegetable crops. But we receive in the form of animal products only a fraction of the calories fed to animals. The difference is due to the necessity of maintaining breeding stock, incomplete assimilation of feed by animals, the energy requirements of the animal for activity and maintenance of body temperature, production of inedible portions (such as bones, hides) in the animal, as well as unavoidable losses in slaughter.⁴ The ratio between feed calories and animal products fit for human consumption varies with agricultural techniques and the nature of the product. Some four to five feed (or primary) calories may be needed to produce one calorie in the form of milk; eighteen or more may be needed to produce one calorie in the form of beef or eggs. This relationship is referred to as the animal multiplier.

³ In order to illustrate, though necessarily in a rough way, the implications of this assumption, let it be assumed that each person receives a quart of milk a day but no other animal food (such as fats, eggs, meat, fish), and that the calories consumed daily are 3,000 per consumption unit (corresponding roughly to 2,250 calories per person). The animal-vegetable ratio would then be almost 30:70. In reality, unless we wish to destroy the by-products obtained through slaughter, milk consumption implies an additional animal consumption in the form of veal and beef.

⁴ See, for instance, F. A. Harper, "How Much of the World Can We Feed?" in *Food in War and in Peace*, Report by the New York State Legislative Committee on Nutrition (1944).

TABLE 1. EFFECT OF ANIMAL-VEGETABLE RATIO ON TOTAL PRIMARY CALORIES REQUIRED FOR HUMAN DIET OF 3,000 CALORIES (Animal Multiplier = 7)

<i>Animal- Vegetable Ratio</i>	<i>Vegetable Calories in Human Diet</i>	<i>Animal Calories in Human Diet</i>		<i>Total Primary Calories</i>
		<i>In direct consumption</i>	<i>In terms of primary calories</i>	
0:100	3,000	—	—	3,000
10:90	2,700	300	2,100	4,800
50:50	1,500	1,500	10,500	12,000
90:10	300	2,700	18,900	19,200
100:0	—	3,000	21,000	21,000

Thus by increasing the animal proportion in the human diet we multiply the need for primary calories. The extent of this multiplication is illustrated in Table 1, which assumes a human diet containing 3,000 calories per consumption unit a day, and assumes, in accordance with prewar European experience, that the average animal multiplier is seven. Under these conditions the daily primary calories required vary from 3,000, if the diet is wholly vegetable, to 21,000, if it is purely animal. (This does not hold true, of course, if the animal calories are partly in the form of fish. But even in countries like Norway, which had the highest fish consumption in the world, fish supplied only 65 calories per consumption unit a day; on the continent of Europe the figure is generally about 10 calories, and thus negligible in this connection.) A diet composed of half animal and half vegetable calories requires 12,000 primary calories, or four times as many as a pure vegetable diet. The animal-vegetable ratio is, as it were, the balance-wheel of agricultural economics.

Some land is so poor that it can hardly be utilized for anything but grazing. And some by-products of crops are best utilized for feed. Also, the productivity of crop land is, within rather wide limits, a function of the application of manure, a by-product of husbandry.⁵ But with such reservations it can be said that the

⁵ In consequence, the animal-vegetable ratio influences indirectly the sustained productivity of the soil; the higher the animal proportion, the higher and more sustained is soil productivity likely to be. A high vegetable proportion, on the other hand, seems generally to involve a danger of soil erosion.

human and livestock populations compete for the world's primary crops. In ordinary times the distribution of crops between man and beast proceeds so smoothly through the market mechanism that we are generally unaware even of the necessity for a choice. Though human demand for *total* calories is inelastic, it is elastic for animal foods. Small fluctuations in relative prices (compare the famous corn-hog ratio) suffice to induce comparatively large fluctuations in animal stock. In a rich country with a fairly large animal proportion in the diet there are enough primary calories to maintain sufficient total calories for human needs, even if crop production varies widely. In addition to the reserve of calories represented by the livestock itself, such countries have a quantitatively even more important buffer of primary calories in their feed supply.

During the present war the continent of Europe has been cut off from food imports, and domestic crop production has decreased. Nevertheless, by a systematic and carefully calculated decrease in the animal proportion in the diet, primary calories have been released on a scale which, until at least the end of 1944, was sufficient to prevent general starvation. In India, on the other hand, where population exists on an almost exclusively vegetable diet, serious local famines occurred in 1943, though total crops were not noticeably smaller than in preceding years. Disturbances in distribution, caused by inflation and military events, clogged up the normal trade ways, and, in the absence of a food buffer, the result was the famines in Bengal and other places. The disappearance of famine in the rich countries is probably due as much, or more, to the increase in the animal proportion in their diets as to their greater facilities for direct international trade in crops.

It may be noted, too, that during the last century primary crops were increased faster than population. This was feasible because of the increase in the animal proportion, consequent upon higher living standards. Correspondingly, the difficulties of crop-exporting countries in the interwar period can be

explained largely in terms of interference with this proportion. In some countries that were ordinarily crop-importing countries—Germany and Italy, for example—the striving for autarchy made it necessary, if not to decrease animal proportions already attained, at least to prevent further rises in them. This limitation in animal consumption contributed to the decrease in demand for crops. Postwar international trade in crops will depend largely upon the animal proportion that the importing countries will wish, or be able, to adopt in their diets.

It is now possible to form an idea of the effects on demand for agricultural products if diets are increased to desirable levels. For this purpose it is not necessary to make detailed estimates; even if the data were available, and they are not, such estimates would remain largely conjectural.

Let us consider only the poorer countries, which in the aggregate account for just half the world's population. The basis of selection is the list of countries, outside of Europe, in whose diets, according to M. K. Bennet, the "potato-cereal" foods constitute 80 to 100 percent.⁶ These countries are India, the USSR, the Philippines, China, Manchuria, Ceylon, Indo-China, Madagascar, Nigeria. It is assumed that at present their daily human consumption is as high as 3,000 calories per consumption unit (adult male equivalent),⁷ though available evidence suggests that actual consumption is probably lower. When we take into account their further vegetable consumption in the form of fats, sugar, fruits, vegetables and other root crops, their total vegetable proportion is obviously considerably higher than the potato-cereal proportion. Thus it may perhaps be assumed that the animal-vegetable ratio in these countries is 5:95, and even this estimate is likely to be on the high side in regard to the animal proportion.

On this basis, however, the total requirements of primary calories for human food in these countries amount to as much as

⁶ M. K. Bennet, "Wheat in National Diets," in *Wheat Studies* (October 1941).

⁷ According to Bennet's study, the number of consumption units in these countries averages about 75 percent of the population number, and therefore consumption per capita is assumed to be 2,250 calories.

1,140,000 billion a year. With allowance for seed, feed for draft animals and unavoidable loss and waste in storage and distribution—which according to J. H. Richter (whose estimates have been utilized above) ran to some 30 percent in Europe⁸—a yearly crop production of 1,480,000 billion calories may be required.

To give an idea of what these totals mean it can be mentioned that Richter estimates the prewar yearly supply of primary calories on the continent of Europe (excluding the USSR) at 995,000 billion. Of these, 230,000 billion went to feed for draft animals, seed, waste and loss, leaving 765,000 billion for human consumption. Of the latter amount, 270,000 billion was consumed directly by humans, and the rest went to produce 75,000 billion animal calories for human consumption. While these figures are not, of course, directly comparable with the (too high) estimates above, they give a rough idea of the magnitudes involved. The 1,100 million people in the poorest countries consume at most half again as many primary calories as do one-third their number—roughly 350 million people—in continental Europe, in spite of the low consumption levels in eastern and southern Europe.

Assume now that as a result of a policy of freedom from want of food the animal proportion in the diet of the submerged half of mankind increases to 40 percent. The requirements of primary calories for direct human consumption would increase to roughly 3,000,000 billion a year, and if account were taken of feed for draft animals, seed, waste and loss, to nearly 4,000,000 billion. Similar estimates can easily be made for particular geographic areas, on the basis of different animal-vegetable ratios and animal multipliers.⁹ But little would be gained here by such estimates. Even on this general scale the results are revealing. To bring the poorer half of mankind to the nutritional level at present prevailing in the more advanced countries we would need to

⁸ J. H. Richter, "Continental Europe's Pre-War Food Balance," in *Foreign Agriculture*, U. S. Department of Agriculture (August 1942).

⁹ It seems likely that in countries like India, where the methods of production are primitive, the animal multiplier is higher than in the West, and that improved methods of husbandry can cause certain initial savings in the use of crops.

supply at least 2,500,000 billion *extra* crop calories a year. This amount of primary calories is about two and one-half times the total prewar European supply, and twenty-five times the total prewar European food imports.

Potential Population Growth

Thus far we have dealt only with the food requirements of the present world population. In reality, however, the population is growing, and particularly fast in the East (except, perhaps, in areas like China, which are suffering the direct effects of war). Table 2 illustrates population trends in various Eastern countries in the course of the last generation.

The generally increasing excess of births over deaths is due mainly to falling death rates; in some of these countries birth rates, too, have fallen, but in births the decline is less general and less marked. In India alone the population is increasing by about 5 million a year. Obviously, any long-term program of feeding the world has to concern itself with the effects of population growth. And, even more important, it must be realized that, as Malthus pointed out, the food supply is in itself one of the primary factors in determining growth.

The saving of life, and consequent population increase, which is now proceeding in the backward areas is due largely to modern administration and its efforts to control epidemics, famines and

TABLE 2. BIRTHS AND DEATHS IN EASTERN COUNTRIES, PER THOUSAND OF POPULATION, Averages 1911-13 and 1931-35 ^a

Country	Births		Deaths		Excess of Births	
	1911-13	1931-35	1911-13	1931-35	1911-13	1931-35
Ceylon	36.5	36.9	31.8	24.7	4.7	12.2
Federated Malay States	34.9	36.9	19.9	15.0
British India	38.6	34.4	29.9	23.5	8.7	10.9
Japan	34.9	31.6	20.7	17.9	14.2	13.7
Egypt	42.3	42.9	25.8	27.4	16.5	15.5
Philippines	32.9	31.4	19.1	16.4	13.8	15.0

^a From League of Nations, *Statistical Year-Book*.

tribal warfare and in general to promote irrigation, public hygiene and order. But in the long run, and after a certain point, a continuing fall in mortality would probably depend more on improvements in standards of living, and especially on nutrition. While no one factor is likely to produce a significant fall in mortality, it seems reasonable to assume, as a working hypothesis, that if diets in the East were to become equivalent to those in the West, mortality would on the whole tend to fall to similar levels. This assumption seems particularly reasonable as it is unlikely that nutritional standards could be consistently improved without a simultaneous improvement in other fields and in social services.

It is axiomatic that populations cannot increase indefinitely at any constant rate, however low. After periods of expansion some kind of at least rough equilibrium between births and deaths must be restored. In principle this occurs in either of two ways: deaths increase to the level of births; or births decline to the level of deaths. The first solution is popularly identified with the name of Malthus. But the restoration or maintenance of equilibrium through the Malthusian checks—want, the effects of want, and war—precludes *eo ipse* freedom from want. Any attempt to raise living standards permanently in a Malthusian situation is self-defeating. Thus the policy of freedom from want tacitly assumes that equilibrium will be attained by a reduction of births. But it is often overlooked that, even at best, certain thorny problems are involved in the establishment of a non-Malthusian equilibrium, entailing great, even if temporary, effects on the size of population. It is necessary, therefore, to consider certain features of the mechanism of population growth.

The simplest way in which to visualize the dynamics of population growth is to recall that population numbers are a function of two factors: births during a period of time; and average expectation of life. Consider a hypothetical population having a constant number of births yearly, say 100,000. If it tends toward a Malthusian equilibrium its mortality is high and its expectation of life is low; assuming the latter to be 20 years, as it may well

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be, under extreme conditions, the population will be in numerical equilibrium at 2 million. On the other hand, if it tends toward a Western type of equilibrium, its mortality is low and its expectation of life is high; assuming the latter to be 65 years, as in advanced countries, the equilibrium population will be 6.5 million.¹⁰ Therefore when the average expectation of life increases in the course of development, the population expands, even if the number of births remains constant. In order to distinguish this type of population increase from such increase as is due only to increase in the number of births (at a constant expectation of life), I shall call it a *population explosion*: it is often sudden, if not violent.

But in reality population explosions have not occurred on the basis of a constant number of births. What actually happened in the spontaneous population explosions of the past was that the decline in mortality rates was more rapid than the decline in natality rates. Hence, as a secondary effect of the population explosion, the absolute number of yearly births increased, thereby further increasing the rate of expansion and the final equilibrium population.

The reasons for this observed sequence of development are several, but certain common traits are observable. The fall in mortality is apparently touched off by improvements in standards of living, understood in their wider sense to include such public measures as sanitation and vaccination. At the lowered mortality families can survive with fewer births per generation, but even if individual parents are aware of all the intricate implications of a new mortality situation, they will change only slowly their intimate habits and beliefs, anchored as these are in long tradition and supported by public opinion. Only, as it were, hesitantly (if at all) do birth rates begin to decline.

Experience does suggest, however, that once birth rates have

¹⁰ Correspondingly, by keeping the expectation of life constant, we can study the influence of changes in number of births. In actual fact, of course, population fluctuates, because of changes in both births and expectation of life.

definitely begun to fall, the process proceeds at an accelerated rate. The static social order is loosened up. Individuals and classes become eager to better their lot, and a period of social flux sets in. Families, particularly those of urban wage-earners, find children a handicap in their desire to rise economically. In the conflict between large families and higher consumption, family size may be pressed down even to a point where the absolute number of births becomes too small to assure the numerical equilibrium of population. At this later stage, as has been evident in some European countries, strong social counter-pressures may become necessary to keep birth rates even at the levels required for the maintenance of a stable population.

But meanwhile the lag between the declines in death and in birth rates results in an increasing number of births per year. How great this increase will be (and thus the final equilibrium population) depends upon the relative rapidity with which mortality and natality fall, and varies from one case to another. Indeed, this lag represents the chief, but not the only, danger contained in the population explosion. If the lag is large enough (or if the birth rate fails to respond at all, as conceivably it may) the population increase becomes so large as to outrun the possibility of expanding production.

The standard of living then falls, and with it the expectation of life, until equilibrium is restored on the basis of increased mortality. The population explosion becomes abortive, and degenerates gradually into a Malthusian process. The risk of an abortive explosion is great in proportion to the absolute magnitude of the bases from which it is touched off: the lag between the decreases in mortality and in natality, and the scarcity of natural resources and technical skill in the populations involved.¹¹

¹¹ It is obviously difficult to distinguish statistically between an abortive explosion and the usual Malthusian situation. The author believes, however, that a more intensive study of the historical material would show abortive explosions to be fairly common occurrences. The famines and epidemics of the past, with consequent improvements in standards of living, may perhaps be interpreted as starting points of series of abortive explosions.

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If we now turn from the population explosions of the past to the potential explosions of the future, certain important differences should be noted. The Western explosions generally began and developed during a period of *laissez faire*. They were spontaneous, in the sense that they were not caused by government intervention, but were generated by the peoples themselves. There were no readymade patterns of medicine, public hygiene, sanitation or nutrition; lifesaving methods had to be developed by the often costly and always slow method of trial and error.

In the East, on the other hand, the explosions are generally induced by measures imposed by governments according to imported patterns; they depend more on imitation than on invention. Therefore we may assume that under conditions of freedom from want, the saving of life in the East would proceed no more slowly, to say the least, than it did in Europe and America. And it is doubtful whether we can expect the decrease in natality to be any more rapid than in the West. On the contrary, there may well be an even slower decrease. Popular education is less developed, the philosophy of life less individualistic and hedonistic, and the incentive of people to increase standards of living seems less compelling.¹² It is likely, then, that a policy of freedom from want would lead to a faster increase in the annual number of births than in Europe, and that the incipient explosions would be of unique violence.

We are not concerned, however, with the highest possible, or even the probable, population increase that would result from such a policy, but rather with the minimum expansion that can be expected. The usual population projections (which aim at some degree of realism in the short run) are irrelevant to this task. But a general indication of possible future population numbers is provided by the simple device of multiplying the yearly number of births in countries of incipient explosions by

¹² We may disregard here the naive theory that the mere dissemination of information about contraceptive methods would have significant effects in a situation of the kind envisaged above.

the average expectation of life in countries that have already achieved a measure of freedom from want. As indicated above, a life expectancy of about 65 years seems reasonable for this purpose. There remains the necessity of finding the appropriate number of births.

Unfortunately, vital statistics leave much to be desired in the areas under consideration. But for purposes of illustration it may be useful to consider the situation in India. The officially recorded birth rate there is 34 per thousand (average 1931-35), but registration is incomplete; according to estimates of the Office of Population Research at Princeton University, the true birth rate for the same period is 45 per thousand,¹³ corresponding to about 18 million births annually in a population of 400 million. On the basis of this estimate, and a present expectation of life in India of about 32 years,¹⁴ the equilibrium population would be 570 million. But the average expectation of life under freedom from want has been assumed to increase gradually to some 65 years, and thus the final equilibrium population, on the basis of present births, would be 1,170 million, or roughly three times the present number. This figure, it should be repeated, represents, under given assumptions (which exclude a population catastrophe), a *minimum*. It assumes that from now on the fall in birth rates will be so rapid as to maintain an absolute number of yearly births at the present level. Actually, of course, births are increasing, in absolute numbers, and would be likely to increase even faster in future under a universal policy of freedom from want.

Assuming that the Indian minimum figure is applicable to the whole of the submerged half of mankind, its minimum numbers in the course of development could be expected to reach about 3,300 million, or some three times its present level. If under the same conditions population in the rest of the world were to

¹³ Kingsley Davis, "Demographic Facts and Policy in India," in *Demographic Studies of Selected Areas of Rapid Growth*, Milbank Memorial Fund (New York 1944).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 47. The official figure is lower: 26 years.

increase by only half as much, we could expect at a minimum a world population approaching 6 billion.

Again, it should be emphasized that these figures are not in the nature of a prognosis. They are intended only to show the *minimum* expansion of population implied in a transition on a world scale from a Malthusian to a Western type of population equilibrium. If the assumptions are very conservative, as is no doubt true, then the actual population increase would be greater; but it would be futile even to guess at a significant maximum figure.¹⁵

Potential Expansion of the Food Supply

Some concern about the future does not seem unnatural in face of the strain that a policy of freedom from want would put on the food supply. At present, however, the prevailing mood is one of optimism. The following quotation is not untypical: "But let us suppose that, in spite of the decline of the birth rate among the whites, the population of the world will treble in the two next centuries, as it has done in the two last centuries. It would then amount to about 6 milliards. This figure, related to the economic resources of the world, is rather small. The land surface of the world is equal to 33 or 34 milliards of acres. Assuming that there are 15 milliards of acres of arable land there would be—with a total population of 6 milliards—2.5 acres per person, which is at least twice as much as is necessary to support a single individual."¹⁶

Another example of the divorcement of demography and economic analysis is found in the January 1945 issue of the *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, edited

¹⁵ If the present rate of population increase were to continue, the world population would reach about 21 billion two centuries hence. Figures of this nature have value chiefly as a demonstration of the necessarily temporary nature of present rates of increase. See Kingsley Davis, "The World Demographic Transition," in American Academy of Political and Social Science, *Annals* (January 1945).

¹⁶ R. R. Kuczynski, "World Population Problems," in *International Affairs*, London (October 1944).

by Professor Kingsley Davis and devoted to the subject, "World Population in Transition." Professor Davis states that "a rapid growth of world population need hold no terrors. The world can probably hold several billion people with no great inconvenience." But Professor J. J. Spengler, in the only paper in that issue devoted to economic analysis, concludes that "the arable land of the world probably cannot, under present conditions, support in comfort more than 2.5 billions (if that many)." It seems justifiable to assume that the key words, "with no great inconvenience" and "in comfort" are roughly equivalent.

Now in order to bring the diets of the submerged half of the world to accepted standards of nutrition, the present primary calorie supply of those areas should, as we have seen, be roughly trebled. If in the course of the potential population explosions the population should no more than treble, the primary calorie requirements would increase about nine times. If we keep our estimates for the rest of the world on the low side, assuming that primary calories need be increased by 50 percent and that population will increase by the same proportion, the total world requirements would increase six times.

Is it reasonable to assume that production can be expanded at this, or a higher rate? No definite answer can be given. The simplest way to expand agricultural production is through cultivation of new land. In the not-too-distant past, when virgin land was to be had for the taking, people regarded natural resources as inexhaustible. From this viewpoint the explosions of the populations in the Atlantic community could be viewed with equanimity, regardless of the fact that they started on the basis of a population of some 150 million, rather than on a figure almost ten times as large. Meanwhile natural resources have not increased, and will not.

Arable land is not a simple concept. The limit of cultivation is a function of cost; as food prices increase, progressively less productive land can be pressed into service. One acre of land means many things, and a doubling, say, of the present cultivated

area would, under a given technique, less than double production. Land in Greenland and in Greece is different, and figures of cultivable land per capita mean little or nothing, unless we are able to measure the quality of land. Moreover, the extension of cultivation to woodland (or to natural prairie) might upset the natural balance, worsen climate, and induce floods and soil erosion. Expansion after a point might decrease total long-run production.

In India and China, for instance, forest destruction and wood-hunger have profoundly affected the whole way of life. In India the Upper Ganges plain was once covered by forests, but extension of cultivation, grazing, burning and erosion have wiped out all tree growth except for a narrow strip at the foot of the Himalayas. As a result, there is now available annually, to 50,000,000 persons, a per capita quantity of one-tenth of a cubic foot of timber and one cubic foot of fuel. The rural population is forced to burn cattle droppings and agricultural refuse which should have been used to maintain soil fertility. The situation in China is even graver. In northwest China forest destruction has gone equally far, and the population has long been forced to give up almost completely the luxury of keeping domestic animals; soil fertility is maintained at reasonable levels only around the great towns, where the supply of night soil is ample. It would not be possible to maintain high living standards and a balanced agriculture in the face of a general world deforestation, already less than a distant possibility.

I have been unable to find any data in support of Mr. Kuczynski's "assumption" that nearly 50 percent of the land surface is cultivable. Most appropriate for cultivation are the extensively cultivated plainlands, more particularly in Europe and North America. In the naturally most favored countries—Denmark and Hungary—cultivated land accounts, respectively, for 62 and 60 percent of the area. In intensively cultivated Germany the figure is 38 percent, in Belgium 34 percent, in England 23 percent; the average for Europe is 29 percent. The land area (with some excep-

tions) includes inland waters, and also mountains, deserts, tundra and swamp land. It includes areas that are too dry and hot, areas that are too wet and cold, and areas where the soil is too poor or too eroded for cultivation. And in Europe wasteland is rare in comparison with the rest of the world, where we have the mountains of Tibet, the deserts of the Sahara and inner Australia, and the vast tundras of Canada and Siberia. In China only some 10 percent of the area is considered cultivable.

It seems optimistic in the light of such facts to assume that cultivation in the world as a whole can be extended as far as to the present European average of some 30 percent. Most geographers would give a far lower figure, perhaps varying between 10 and 20 percent of the earth's land surface; the studies of Isaiah Bowman and others are in general agreement that there are only small and scattered areas of good land not now in use, and that most of the allegedly "vacant" land is between the marginal and the definitely submarginal. Weighing such partial evidence as is available, it would seem too optimistic to assume that the present cultivated area can be as much as doubled. At any rate, such an expansion would necessitate the pressing into service of land much inferior in quality to average land now in use.¹⁷ It would also encroach on prairie and pasture, and decrease fodder crops and grazing. But let us assume that it is possible to double the land at present under cultivation, without lowering its average quality. Productivity per acre (in terms of primary calories) would still have to be trebled in order to meet minimum world food requirements that are potential under freedom from want.

¹⁷ It is obviously difficult to define marginal land. Of the some 2,000 million acres in the United States, about 400 million are under some kind of cultivation. Of these, perhaps 100 million are marginal under current conditions; under other assumptions a further 100 million may be drawn into cultivation. In general, the possibilities of irrigation and drainage are exaggerated. Only three main areas offer hope of considerably extended irrigation: India, where irrigation has been extended in recent years, but it is doubtful whether remaining possibilities there are very great; the United States, where moderate acreage is susceptible to irrigation at great cost; and Russian Turkestan and the Tigris-Euphrates area.

There is great scope for increased productivity in agriculture, though in the past such progress has been less marked in terms of land than in terms of labor. It is possible, also, to plant more high-yielding and fewer low-yielding crops. It would carry us too far to examine such possibilities in any detail, but the yield of wheat may be taken as illustration.

The International Institute of Agriculture at Rome has estimated that for the period 1935-39 the world's average yield of wheat per hectare was 9.8 quintals. The average for Europe was 14; the highest figure was about 30, achieved in Denmark and the Netherlands. If these figures are representative, it would be necessary to increase productivity everywhere to the level prevailing in Denmark and the Netherlands, in order to achieve the necessary trebling of world production. But it is doubtful whether in a few generations productivity could be brought to the intensive levels prevailing in the naturally most favored and technically most advanced of the European nations. It takes time to build up the necessary skills and organization. Intensive production also requires a large outlay of fertilizers per acre, and some concern has already been expressed as regards the sufficiency of known reserves of natural phosphates.

It should not be overlooked that the high productivity in countries like Denmark and the Netherlands rests on, among other factors, a very high animal production, which permits selectivity as to land used for cereal production, and high application of natural manure to each acre. It is common to place extravagant faith in mineral fertilizers, but it may be argued, on the basis of experience, that the marginal efficiency of mineral fertilizers has a steep slope of diminishing returns whenever the animal ratio deviates from some uncertain optimum. Therefore a general increase of productivity to the highest known levels involves the universal fulfilment of conditions of which some are by nature local rather than universal.

While it is agreeable to contemplate the possibilities of future technical progress (and such possibilities should be kept in mind

in a realistic appraisal of the future), there has arisen a school of thinking which is inclined to consider potential progress in line with actual fact. Responsible policy should not fall victim to wishful thinking. There is no evidence that any known discovery, or any discovery in prospect, will ultimately overcome the law of diminishing returns in agriculture. This is the finding that the continuous application of labor and capital to a given area of land will, after a point (which is in part a function of technique), yield smaller and smaller returns.

Turning to countries having the greatest population pressure, instead of to the world as a whole, the situation seems even less encouraging. During and after a successful population explosion, the Eastern areas, in particular, would be unable to raise enough food to feed their populations adequately, and would need imports.¹⁸ But these would not be free gifts. In the long run they would have to be paid for by exports, which to a large extent would have to be composed of manufactured goods. In addition to expanding consumption, the poor countries would have to find the means of financing large-scale industrialization and consequent imports of raw materials.

Thus in the export markets for manufactured goods, competition would increase greatly, as the newly industrialized countries sought an outlet for their surplus, and their growing demand for food and industrial raw materials would drive up the prices of these products. In other words, the prices of food and raw materials would rise in relation to manufactured goods. The position of countries would be profoundly affected by such a change in the terms of trade. Old countries, which depended on the export of manufactured goods and imports of food and raw materials, would be shaken both by the mounting difficulties of exporting and by the higher prices they would have to pay for food and other raw material imports. Benefits would accrue

¹⁸ Take the example of India. If *all* land could be cultivated, and if we assume with Mr. Kuczynski that $1\frac{1}{4}$ acre is needed to feed one person, India could feed adequately 430 million people.

chiefly to countries possessing large reserves of land and natural resources, even if in these countries, too, urban populations would have to pay more for food and other necessities. The situation likely to develop bears a striking resemblance to the Ricardian theory of the distribution of the national product, transposed to an international scale.

For some time to come policies are not likely to be formed according to purely economic criteria, or on the assumption of a unified global economy. We should consider, then, the probable national reactions to a development as outlined above, or even to the threat of such a development. It is unlikely that fundamental changes in the position of nations, and in relative standards of living necessitated by them, would proceed for long without political, social and economic countermeasures. A political climate would emerge appropriate to protectionism, economic, social and demographic; consequent international friction and insecurity might provoke an excess of nationalism compared to which that of the interwar period would appear mild. It stands to reason that reactions caused by a desire to protect oneself against too *cheap* imports are likely to be less violent than those caused by a fear of imports too *dear*.

Conclusions

The purpose of this paper has been to raise issues relevant to a policy of freedom from want of food. The analysis has been based on broad assumptions, and the conclusions, too, are general and tentative. They are not predictions, and they suggest problems to be faced rather than readymade solutions, or recommendations of policy. These conclusions may be summarized in several general observations.

First, freedom from want of food may be feasible for a world population of the present size, or even for a moderately larger one. But if the foregoing deliberately conservative estimates show the order of magnitude of potential supply of and demand for food, there seems little hope of both raising food standards to

Western levels in the world as a whole, and taking care of such population expansion as would spontaneously result from such a policy. A considerably larger population increase could of course be fed, at least temporarily, on the basis of a lower animal proportion in the human diet than has been assumed above. But in the long run the effects of a low animal proportion on the productivity of agriculture must also be taken into account.

Second, nutritional science could render some service in the attempt to establish a non-Malthusian population equilibrium if it were to develop dietary standards which, while nutritionally competent and subjectively palatable, were cheaper in terms of land than the present "recommended allowances."

Third, population explosions that are actually proceeding in the submerged areas, on a standard of living much lower than has been postulated above, seem already dangerously close to degenerating into Malthusian processes, which, while curbing future growth, would lower already-existing living standards. All the more, then, does the hope of a universal increase in the standard of living depend on whether the even more rapid population expansion involved in a spontaneous transition from a Malthusian to a Western population equilibrium can be kept within narrower limits than was the case in the West. This problem is too complex to be meaningfully discussed in terms of the popular "birth control" propaganda. The real problem involves the whole of social and economic policy, and cannot be dealt with in an isolated or narrowly technical sense.

It should be noted that some highly competent demographic experts, while only too well aware of the grave implications of a continuance of the present exceptionally high rates of increase in the backward areas, are on the whole skeptical as to the possibility of social and economic policies that would reduce population growth soon enough to prevent a multiplication of present populations. Thus Professor Frank W. Notestein recommends a policy of increasing by outside help the standards of living in areas of rapid growth, in the hope that in the course of popula-

tion explosions so touched off (or more generally accelerated) people would spontaneously, under the influence of modernization (including education, urbanization and the like), reduce natality soon enough to reach a Western population equilibrium.¹⁹ This solution is daring. It would probably somewhat reduce the utilization of resources solely on an increase in mere numbers; it is in immediate line with national and social objectives; it need not interfere with laissez faire in demographic matters; it places the penalty for failure on future generations.

There could be no objection to "Notestein's process," provided that economic resources were great enough (as they were in the smaller population explosions of the past) to permit the expansion of production at the very rapid rate and on the colossal scale implied. But the conclusions above seem to indicate that, in the face of natural obstacles, the results of an attempt to expand on such a scale would not be compatible with the goals implied in a policy of freedom from want.²⁰

Finally, it appears that the tasks involved in realizing a policy of freedom from want of food are too vital and too complex to be delegated to individual experts or even to private organizations of research. They require the coordinated efforts of responsible governments, and come organically within the sphere of the new

¹⁹ See, for instance, his "Problems of Policy in Relation to Areas of Heavy Population Pressure," in *Demographic Studies of Selected Areas of Rapid Growth* (cited above).

²⁰ It may be argued—though the discussion is outside the scope of this paper—that "Notestein's process" could still be successful if the social objectives were lowered, and if the expectation of life were not permitted to rise so much as in the West. We might, for instance, raise living standards unevenly, with emphasis on elements other than food. The difference between such a policy and actual practice is not striking. Whether this policy would have chances for success can be determined only on the basis of quantitative analysis for which the data are still lacking. It should be remembered, though, that such a modification of "Notestein's process," even if successful, would imply, first, a differentiation of social objectives by area, race or nationality, and second, a risk of famine to the extent that the animal proportion in the diet had to be kept at a low level. Thus, even if the policy succeeded on the basis of such lowered social objectives, it would not preclude the necessity for constructive social engineering aiming at population numbers compatible with available resources.

Organization of Food and Agriculture. It falls beyond the scope of this article to discuss actual policy. But the foregoing analysis seems to indicate that a sound policy must rest on an integration of research which contains, at least, the following elements:

1. Estimates of food requirements per capita at different nutritional levels, expressed in terms of a common unit.
2. Estimates of productive capacity (by areas and for the world as a whole) at given levels of resources and at varying levels of productivity, in terms of the various factors of production.
3. Studies indicating the need for and possibilities of international trade in food at various requirement and population levels. Inquiries should be made of the degree to which requirements can be translated into effective demand.
4. Studies aimed at developing integrated social policies by which populations could be kept within the numerical limits indicated by a synthesis of the studies above. In this connection intensive area and field studies are needed, showing the relationship between institutions, beliefs, tradition and mores on the one hand, and fertility on the other hand.

Thus a policy of freedom from want of food branches out until it embraces broad fields of social science—economics, demography, technology, and sociology. How we meet this great challenge of the twentieth century will affect the future of mankind.

(Princeton, N. J.)

ON THE INCIDENCE OF PUBLIC DEBT

BY HEDWIG REINHARDT

I

PUBLIC debts have always attracted special attention, regardless of size and circumstances. From the times of the classical school of economics to our own days, emotional flares have lit the scene, the protagonists sometimes damning and sometimes praising this institution. And while such emotionalism is still evident here and there, on the whole the rational approach to the subject has probably won a lasting victory. In this view the public debts are judged not by themselves but according to circumstances. There is nothing intrinsically good or bad about them. They are essential implements of fiscal policy, bent on the attainment of certain economic aims—economic stability, progress, the avoidance of unemployment, and a national income of a size compatible with these ends. Accordingly, the incurring, servicing and amortization of debts may be right under one set of conditions and wrong under another. The rise and fall of debts can be evaluated only with such relative measures. There are no absolute categories. On these principles concerning public debts and their role there is today more fundamental agreement than is usually acknowledged. The differences of opinion are mainly in the stress on the economic aims of a rational fiscal policy.¹

¹ In this connection see, for instance, the recent controversy between H. G. Moulton, in *The New Philosophy of the Public Debt* (Washington 1943) and A. H. Hansen, in *How Shall We Deal with the Public Debt?* (New York University Institute on Postwar Reconstruction, Series II, No. 7, 1943), underlined by the analysis of D. McCord Wright, "Moulton's New Philosophy of Public Debt," in *American Economic Review*, vol. 33 (September 1943) p. 573; also the lively discussion between H. G. Moulton and D. McCord Wright, "Communications," *American Economic Review*, vol. 34 (March 1944) pp. 116-21. In the concept of a rationalized fiscal policy the use of debt for the achievement of economic aims is given primary importance, but that goal becomes the sole guiding principle for all fiscal measures in the view of A. P. Lerner, "Functional Finance and the Federal Debt," *Social Research*, vol. 10 (February 1943) p. 38.

But even in such a rational atmosphere, mere quantitative aspects may evoke fascination or repulsion. With federal debt figures scheduled to reach 252 billion dollars by the end of the fiscal year 1944-45, entailing an interest bill of 3.75 billion, and to reach 292 billion with interest running to 4.5 billion annually at the end of the fiscal year 1945-46²—dwarfing the state and local debts of around 17.4 billion³ and foreshadowing still larger amounts for the years to come⁴—some observers experience a nostalgic feeling for the 26 billion dollar debt at the end of the last war. This time they anticipate Doomsday. Others cannot help admiring the fact that the fiscal and economic system is apparently unharmed, despite these astronomical figures. The proper answer to both interpretations is that debts lead no isolated existence within the fiscal and economic picture. Large or small, they form only part of an integrated mechanism, of which other revenue instruments and the expenditures they finance are also components. Here the functioning of the parts depends on the smooth working of the entire machinery, and vice versa. Debts, therefore, have no life of their own, neither from a purely fiscal point of view nor in the general economic perspective where the national income dominates the scene and furnishes a basis for the evaluation of fiscal measures.

This national income runs at present to about 158 billion dollars a year, and the corresponding gross national product amounts to 196 billion (1944 price basis), the difference between

² The President's Budget Message to Congress, published January 10, 1945.

³ U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Government Debt in the United States, 1944* (December 1944). As a result of the curtailment of new bond issues and accelerated retirement, state and local debts have declined by over 2.5 billion dollars during the last four years.

⁴ C. Shoup, "Postwar Federal Interest Charges," in *American Economic Review*, vol. 34 (June 1944) p. 74, speaks of 339 billion at the end of the fiscal year 1948. S. E. Harris, ed., *Postwar Economic Problems* (New York 1943) pp. 170-85, makes an extravagant guess at debt possibilities of over 1,000 billion. On the other hand, A. P. Lerner, *op. cit.*, p. 38, on the basis of his concept of functional finance, assumes a natural saturation point at an equilibrium level somewhere between 100 and 300 billion, but this would not preclude a debt above such an equilibrium level at the end of the present war.

the money income and the gross product values being accounted for by depreciation, depletion allowances, business taxes and the like.⁵ Such huge figures reflect the enormously increased spending capacity of the country under the impact of war, and the unprecedented growth of income-generating forces as a result of industrial ingenuity and governmental measures, especially vast federal expenditures. Over 400 billion dollars has been appropriated and authorized for war since 1941,⁶ and in the fiscal year 1944-45 the annual rate of federal expenditure has reached about 99 billion dollars, nine-tenths of it for war. This outlay has been financed over 40 percent by taxes and almost 60 percent by debts. Hence the huge debt figures. They are closely interconnected with the national production, and testify to the country's economic vigor in war, but also in peace.

When that time comes, the nation, saddled with a large debt and heavy taxation, will have to muster all its strength in order to preserve a national income which insures a minimum of unemployment. The total may have to be in the neighborhood of 150 billion dollars, or even more, calculated at prices 25 to 30 percent above prewar levels, and all fiscal measures will have to be directed to the achievement of this aim.

Governmental spending and financing will then recede, in comparison with the years of war. But no return to the prewar levels can be anticipated. There are no historical precedents to justify any assumption to the contrary. In particular, a rational fiscal policy, bent on attaining and preserving a large national income, will be unable to turn back to a status quo ante. No exact forecasts can be made concerning the volume of government spending. It will depend on many factors—on the amount of

⁵ Figures of the Department of Commerce, in *Survey of Current Business* (September 1944). The President's Budget Message of 1945 mentions a figure of 197.5 billion dollars for the gross national product of the calendar year 1944 at current prices.

⁶ U. S. Treasury Department, *Daily Statement*, February 15, 1945; the figure refers to the entire war activities program, including the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and its affiliates.

private expenditure for consumption and investment purposes, on the elasticity of reconversion and expansion of civilian production, on the activities of authorities other than federal, such as the states and local bodies, on the general confidence in economic stability, and on many other political, social and psychological considerations. Moreover, once the transitional span is passed and the backlog of demand for peacetime goods has been absorbed, the problem of keeping the income stream flowing may become more acute than it is immediately after the war. But in any case, sizable public expenditures are not likely to vanish, and they will have to be paid for.⁷

In this perspective the government debt becomes a matter of grave importance—and not just because of its huge figures, which are, after all, fully compatible with the country's productive capacity. The cardinal issues are the implications of the debt structure and the debt procedures for the achievement of the proclaimed goal, an optimum national income.⁸ Among the various possibilities of inquiring into the subject this study chooses the method of distribution analysis. The following pages will examine how the distribution of government securities among the different strata of the population may affect economic develop-

⁷ In the President's 1945 Budget Message federal expenditures of 50 billion dollars are forecast for the demobilization period, and 25 billion thereafter. Such sums would be three to four times the prewar level of federal expenditure. To a much smaller extent, state and local governments too will presumably increase their outlay above the 10 billion average of prewar and war years.

⁸ For estimates of postwar national income at a "full employment" level—with 2 to 3 million unemployed usually conceded as compatible with "full employment"—see, for instance, J. W. Welcker, in *Harvard Business Review* (Summer 1944) p. 433 (115–25 billion dollars annual income 1946–56, at 1942 prices), or J. Mayer, *The Postwar National Income*, Brookings Institution (Washington 1944) pp. 8–11 (123 billion national income at 1943 prices), and the more likely larger figures of Marriner Eccles, in *Federal Reserve Bulletin* (March 1943) p. 224 (160 billion gross national product at 1943 prices), or E. A. Goldenweiser, *ibid.* (May 1944) p. 424 (170 billion gross national product, 140 billion national income at 1943 prices). Similar figures are given by C. Shoup, *op. cit.*, p. 74, and somewhat higher figures by P. A. Samuelson, in *Postwar Economic Problems* (cited above) p. 29; E. E. Hagen and N. B. Kirkpatrick, in *American Economic Review*, vol. 34 (September 1944) p. 472; W. S. Woytinsky and A. Halasi, in *International Postwar Problems*, vol. 1 (September 1944) p. 505.

ment, and on the basis of that analysis will consider how the public debt can be enlisted as an aid in reaching an optimum national income, or at least how it can be prevented from interfering with that achievement.

II

In order to evaluate such implications of the public debt it is necessary to appraise the debt burdens carried by different groups and individuals, and to examine their reactions. This is the search for the incidence of the public debt. The distribution analysis that it involves can take various approaches: the older and rather well established ones which center either on the price aspect or on the problems of spending and investing, or a newer, less explored one which centers on the financing mechanism of debts and especially on how it influences the tax pattern. Basically the three approaches are interrelated. For present purposes it is possible, however, to take a short-cut through the first two and devote the main analysis to the third, the financing mechanism.

The effects of increasing indebtedness on prices and price relationships, or in other words, the inflationary and deflationary implications, have been the chief concern of debt analysis in recent years. Considerations of distribution have entered this type of inquiry only in so far as they seemed to have an essential bearing on such price developments. Government securities in the hands of banks, for instance, are regarded as indicating inflationary tendencies, since they create additional purchasing power. Government securities held by individuals, on the other hand, point to economically curbing, deflationary results, since they absorb existing means. Actually this issue presents one of the crucial postwar problems, but there is no reason to assume that it cannot be adequately solved.⁹

⁹ M. Mitnitzky, for instance—"Aspects of Government Borrowing," in *American Economic Review*, vol. 33 (March 1943) p. 21—analyzes such dangers and considers remedies in the field of central banking. According to the *Federal Reserve Bulletin*

Problems arising from the large-scale receipt of income from government securities by various income groups may become increasingly difficult to adjust in the years to come. Here the distribution analysis is concerned essentially with the question how this income is going to affect the spending-saving schedules.¹⁰ Different income groups within the enlarged "rentier" class will show different attitudes, and the wider the dispersion of such holdings among the population the greater will be the variety of reactions in making or not making use of these funds. In view of the possibility that some prewar discrepancies in the spending-saving orbit may reappear, such questions can have far-reaching consequences for the development of the national income.

But it is the financing mechanism of debts which constitutes the immediate issue for distribution analysis. Here the incidence aspect differs according to the phases of the debt procedure. In their initial stage, at the time of their creation, the majority of government securities represent pure investments and thus carry no really burdensome consequences for the investor. But in other phases of indebtedness, when interest service and amortization enter the picture, a sizable incidence problem arises. Here the taxpayer, who may or may not be the beneficiary,¹¹ has to

(August 1944, pp. 743-52) the repercussions on the banking system during 1943-44 have actually been less than anticipated. On the other hand, the same publication (October 1944, pp. 953-61) stresses the huge accumulation of liquid assets held by individuals and business in the form of currency, deposits and government securities—estimated to reach 189.9 billion dollars at the end of 1944, compared with 83.4 billion three years ago—and the inflationary or deflationary possibilities implied in their use.

¹⁰According to the interesting study by C. Shoup, *op. cit.*, the interest payments will influence the spending-investing problem only to a limited extent, a substantial part of such payments being without economic significance; amortization payments, however, will have complex effects.

¹¹That the payments from the taxpayer to the bondholder are mere "transfers" and leave the national income untouched has been the tenor of the "transfer theory." To a certain extent this opinion has contributed to obscuring the burden of the debt service, but more recently it has been qualified in various respects. See, for instance, D. McCord Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 584; Stuart Chase, *Where's the Money Coming From?* (New York 1943) pp. 105-06; H. G. Moulton, *op. cit.*, p. 63;

foot the bill. Debt burdens therefore become synonymous with the tax incidence which finances them, tempered by the benefit from the income receipt. Thus debts are weighing on the tax pattern, and they are likely to do so in the years to come. They are not going to shape it; but they will exert a substantial influence on its tendencies.

The American tax pattern, for instance, has been viewed as throwing a comparatively heavy burden on the lower income classes (up to \$1,000 a year), a rather equally distributed load on the middle income groups (up to \$5,000) and a rapidly increasing percentage on the higher brackets. This pattern has been called regressive in the lower brackets, proportionate in the middle ones and progressive from there on.¹² The British tax system has shown similar traits, while the Canadian pattern, for example, has been much more regressively marked.¹³ The war has probably intensified these tendencies everywhere, but presumably less in the United States, where heavy excise taxes, with their regressive implications, have been largely avoided. Accordingly, while there may be criticism of the tax pattern, it is not likely to be so intense as to lead to substantial change, although particular taxes may come in for alterations. On the whole, we can reckon with the present tax pattern for some time. The requirements of debt financing will intensify it, presumably in the direction of more regressiveness, but on the other hand, some of its burdensome implications may be removed or even fully compensated by the benefits accruing to the debt-payment receivers.

A. Kähler, "The Public Debt in the Financial Structure," in *Social Research*, vol. 11 (February 1944) pp. 11-26; C. Shoup, *op. cit.*, p. 46; B. U. Ratchford, "The Burden of a Domestic Debt," in *American Economic Review*, vol. 32 (September 1942) p. 455.

¹² G. Colm and H. Tarasov, *Who Pays the Taxes?*, Temporary National Economic Committee Monograph No. 3 (Washington 1941), and *Who Does Pay the Taxes?*, Social Research Supplement IV (New York 1942).

¹³ On the British tax pattern see G. Findlay Shirras and L. Rostas, *The Burden of British Taxation* (Cambridge, Eng. 1942) and G. Findlay Shirras, "Methods of Estimating the Burden of Taxation," in Royal Statistical Society, *Journal*, Part III (1943) p. 214. On Canada see Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, *Report*, 1940, Part I, p. 212, and Part II, Recommendations.

It should be mentioned that serious difficulties exist which tend to impair the validity of debt-incidence conclusions drawn from the present analysis. One of them is the statistical gap in the actual distribution of government security holdings among different income brackets. Another is the impossibility of picking certain taxes out of the budget and labeling them "debt-service taxes," in order to analyze their incidence and their implications for debt financing. Such taxes are not in existence, and for this reason only the tax pattern as a whole can serve as basis.¹⁴ But despite such handicaps the attempt to trace the potential debt incidence in this way seems feasible.¹⁵

III

Two tables are attached demonstrating the present American debt situation. Table 1 shows the distribution, by type of debt, of the amounts outstanding at the start of the calendar year 1945, and Table 2 shows the distribution, by type of holder, of the annual increase in these debts during recent years. The enumeration of types of holders does not, however, reveal the income groups to which the holders belong; it merely indicates in the usual way the different kinds of investors, who belong in various income

¹⁴ For a different approach to the problem of debt burdens see the very interesting study by E. D. Domar, "The 'Burden of the Debt' and the National Income," in *American Economic Review*, vol. 34 (December 1944) p. 798. In that study the tax rate implied in the debt service is calculated and analyzed under the assumptions of a constant and a changing national income, with the result that a growing national income is found to be the decisive factor in offsetting debt burdens.

¹⁵ Comparison between the burdens and benefits of a fiscal measure, in an effort to establish the measure's actual incidence, has been tried at various times. While there are still several theoretical obstacles to a general analysis of this kind, the attempt has been rather successful in regard to one special field: public aid. Studies made in the United States (National Resources Planning Board on Security, Work and Relief Policies, *Report*, 1943, pp. 322-34) and in England (J. R. and U. K. Hicks, "The Beveridge Plan and Local Government Finance," in Manchester Statistical Society, *Transactions*, 1942-43) show that in both countries public aid has been financed largely by taxes burdening the assisted income groups. Thus the potentially stimulating effects of the aid disbursements have been strongly impaired.

INCIDENCE OF THE PUBLIC DEBT

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TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION, CHARACTERISTICS, AND CHIEF HOLDERS OF THE FEDERAL DEBT, JANUARY 1, 1945: By Type of Debt ^a

Type of Debt	Amts. Out- stdg. (bil- lions)	Date of Issue	Date of Matu- rity	Earlier Redeemability		In- ter- est Rate	Chief Holders
				At op- tion of govt.	At op- tion of holder		
BONDS							
Bonds issued before 1920	\$.078	1911-1917	1947-1961	no	no	3.0%	business, in- surance cos., mutual svgs. banks, other banks, trusts, individuals
Postal sav- ings bonds	.117	1922-1935	after 20 yrs.	after 1 yr.	no	2.5	
Treasury bonds	91.584	since 1922	1945-1971	1945-1967	no	1.75-4.25	
Savings bonds	40.360	since 1935	after 10 yrs. (some 12)	no	after 60 days (some 6 mos.)	2.5-2.9	
Depository & ad- justed serv. bonds	.712	1936-1943	1945	yes	yes	2.0-3.0	government agencies and trust funds
Special issues	.500	1936	1946	yes	yes	4.5	
NOTES							
Treasury notes, incl. National Defense series	23.038	since 1940	1945-1948			0.75-1.5	business and banks
Tax series	.094	1942	1945			1.92	
Savings series	9.747	since 1942	after 3 yrs.			1.07	
CERTIFICATES OF INDEBTEDNESS	30.401	1944	1945			0.875	Fed. Res. bks., com. banks
BILLS							
Treasury bills	16.427	1944	1945			0.375	com. banks, Fed. Res. bks.
SPECIAL ISSUES							
Notes and Cer- tificates	15.824	since 1940	1945-1949			1.875-4.0	govt. agencies & trust funds
NON-INTEREST- BEARING DEBT	1.738						
GUARANTEED DEBT	1.513						
TOTAL: GROSS PUBLIC DEBT b	232.144						

^a Figures condensed from Treasury Department, *Daily Statement*, January 1, 1945.^b The total is not the exact sum of the enumerated amounts, as the latter have been rounded.

SOCIAL RESEARCH

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF ANNUAL INCREASE IN FEDERAL DEBT, FISCAL YEARS ENDING JUNE 30, 1941-44, AND TOTAL DEBT OUTSTANDING ON JUNE 30, 1944:

By Type of Holder ^a

Type of Holder	Increase, Fiscal Year Ending June 30				Total Outstdg. 6/30/44
	1941	1942	1943	1944	
IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS					
NON-BANK HOLDERS	\$3.6	\$15.0	\$32.3	\$37.9	\$117.7
Govt. agencies and trust funds	1.4	2.1	3.7	4.8	19.1
Mutual savings banks	.3	.5	1.4	2.0	7.3
Insurance companies	.5	1.9	3.9	4.0	16.8
Corporations and other assocs.	—	3.4	10.6	12.2	29.8
Other holders b	1.4	6.9	13.0	14.9	44.7
BANKING SYSTEM	3.3	6.8	30.6	23.7	83.4
Commercial banks	3.5	6.3	26.0	16.0	68.5
Federal Reserve banks	— .3	.5	4.6	7.7	14.9
TOTAL	6.9	21.8	63.0	61.6	201.1
IN PERCENT OF TOTAL					
NON-BANK HOLDERS	59%	69%	52%	61%	59%
Govt. agencies and trust funds	20	10	6	8	9
Mutual savings banks	4	2	2	3	4
Insurance companies	7	9	6	6	9
Corporations and other assocs.	—	16	17	19	15
Other holders b	27	32	21	25	22
BANKING SYSTEM	41	31	48	39	41
Commercial banks	45	28	41	26	34
Federal Reserve banks	— 4	2	7	13	7
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

^a Figures from *Federal Reserve Bulletin* (August 1944) p. 750, and from U. S. Treasury Department, *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1943*, p. 72. The totals are not the exact sum of the enumerated amounts, as the latter have been rounded.

^b "Other holders" consist of individuals, partnerships, personal trusts, state and local governments, the latter holding only a very small percentage. In the cited publications "corporations and other associations" are not separated from "other holders" in 1944; the distribution between the two groups has here been estimated on the basis of previous developments and recent indications.

brackets. Addition of the 17.4 billion dollars of state and local securities would not change the general outlines of the distributions, for such bonds are owned by approximately the same types of investors—in presumably about the same income groups—as are the marketable federal obligations. It is possible that the tax exemption feature—which remains for state and local bonds though it has been removed from new federal issues since 1941—has led some high-income investors to prefer state and local securities; but the amount of such diversion cannot be large, and the huge preponderance of the federal debt would prevent it from having any appreciable influence on the total.

The two tables indicate even at first sight certain clear-cut features of the debt pattern: the rather large proportion of short and medium term securities; the increasing weight of institutional holdings compared with private ownership; the low interest rates, indicating a relatively cheap debt service; the earlier redeemability at the option of the Treasury of some parts of the long-term debt (especially Treasury bonds); and, for an important part of the long-term debt, the earlier redeemability at the option of the holder (Savings bonds). This latter characteristic acquires added importance from the fact that, quite apart from the repayment claims that may thereby be raised against the Treasury, the federal maturity bill has reached unprecedented heights, chiefly from short and medium term obligations that are falling due within a year. Already the amounts involved are fluctuating around 60 billion dollars.

The incidence implications of these features differ with the type of debt and with the phase of the debt process that is being analyzed.

Today unfunded debt (short and medium term) accounts for over 40 percent of the total amount of interest-bearing federal securities; it represents a much smaller percentage of the state and local obligations. This large amount of unfunded federal debt leads to grave problems in the monetary and credit field, and its potential dangers have never been underestimated. But

the incidence aspects of this category of debt are relatively unimportant.

In the first place, nobody is burdened by the acquisition of such securities. Their holders are chiefly banks (commercial banks and Federal Reserve banks) and, to a smaller extent, corporations and other business enterprises. The non-marketable part of such debt—the tax-savings notes, for example—is owned entirely by business, while Treasury bills and certificates of indebtedness are liquid and cheap bank investments, providing the instrumentalities for the absorption of temporarily idle means. As far as interest payments are concerned, the rates are exceedingly low, and if they remain at or near their present level, comparatively small amounts of tax financing will be needed—especially since a sizable part of these debts has the form of discount paper. And the situation is much the same with regard to amortization. While the individual holder is paid at maturity, the financing of such amounts is actually effected to a large extent by refinancing in similar kind. Only a relatively small part is likely to require tax revenue.

On the whole, therefore, these debts do not influence the tax pattern, except for some slight indentation. Their incidence is largely neutralized. If avoidance of any further regressiveness in the tax pattern should be considered a postwar aim, this neutral incidence constitutes an argument for maintaining the present unfunded-debt structure, at least to a considerable extent.

Funded (long-term) debt represents today less than 60 percent of all outstanding federal securities, and a much larger percentage of the state and local debt. Long-term obligations were formerly regarded as proof of a sound fiscal set-up, in which the short-term debt figured more or less as an unwelcome intruder. But from the point of view of debt incidence, the scales are turned and the funded debt imposes its full weight. In order to analyze the incidence of funded debt a distinction must be made between its two most important components, the ordinary marketable Treasury bonds, and the non-marketable Savings bonds.

Over 100 billion dollars of ordinary Treasury bonds of all governmental levels are at present outstanding in the United States.¹⁶ They are owned by insurance companies, mutual savings banks, trust funds, corporations and other business enterprises; also some individuals of the higher income brackets invest in such securities. The purchases of any of these buyers are made as pure investments, in order to derive income and to preserve values.¹⁷ Thus no incidence problem, no burden, is entailed in the act of purchase. But as soon as the interest service starts, the situation is quite different. At the present rates of about 2.5 percent for federal Treasury bonds, and somewhat higher percentages for state and local bonds, the annual interest payments for the 100 billion or so of such securities are still below 3 billion dollars, though they will probably exceed that figure in the future, even if interest rates should remain at or near their present low level. Such an amount presages no great danger when it is viewed against the background of a full-length federal, state and local tax bill running at present to over 50 billion dollars a year, and a national income of 158 billion. But when it is viewed qualitatively rather than quantitatively it clearly reveals the meaning of debt incidence.

This interest service is financed out of a tax pattern which, by and large, does not correspond to the distribution of such securities among holders. A comparatively great amount of these tax payments comes from those in the lower and lower-middle income brackets, who, on the other hand, do not receive the benefits of their financial contribution. Only indirectly they may derive a certain advantage, if they are connected with some of the institutional holders of these bonds, for instance as policyholders of an insurance company which invests in such securities

¹⁶ At the beginning of the calendar year 1945 there was 91.5 billion dollars outstanding in federal Treasury bonds. About 17 billion of the total 17.4 billion dollars of state and local debt is held in this form; the rest is short-term debt.

¹⁷ The investment character of government security purchases of this kind is clearly indicated by the type of holders; on this subject see Temporary National Economic Committee, *Final Report* (Washington 1941) p. 189.

or as owners of savings accounts in a mutual savings bank which counts Treasury bonds among its assets. In reality, however, such indirect benefits are rather insignificant. On the whole the interest payments on these bonds are paid by and received by different income groups. This means an intensification of the regressive tendencies of the existing tax pattern. The degree of such intensification may be small at the moment, but any drop in the nominal and real income of the affected groups and any rise in interest rates would increase the degree.

The repayment phase of these Treasury bonds may or may not result in a similar incidence, depending on how the amortization is brought about. If a large cash repayment were made, that is, a real debt reduction of sizable proportions, the non-participating taxpayer would be squarely hit by a pronounced intensification of the regressive tendencies of the tax pattern. But actually this possibility can be largely disregarded. As a rule only a small part of such securities is, on maturity, paid out and financed in cash. The preponderant amount is refunded into new loans and only nominally repaid. Moreover, most of these Treasury bonds are not kept alive until maturity—which would mean for five to twenty-five years—but are repaid or refunded by the government whenever its fiscal policy warrants. Earlier redeemability is therefore an important implement for smoothing out potential incidence burdens. From this point of view, callability clauses at the option of the government, as they exist today in most bond contracts, are especially significant.¹⁸ Shifts of holdings among owners can scarcely be expected to influence the incidence pattern, as the new owners are likely to be within the same institutional or individual income group.

In short, refunding actions, at maturity or at an earlier call, are at present the chief method of amortization of Treasury

¹⁸ See in this connection proposals like that made recently by S. Leland, "Management of the Public Debt After the War," in *American Economic Review, Supplement* (June 1944) pp. 89-133, which suggests the use of consols or perpetuities, subject to unlimited call at the option of the Treasury, instead of securities with definite maturity schedules.

bonds. The larger their role compared with cash repayments, the lighter will be the pressure of debt incidence and the intensification of regressive effects of the tax pattern. Still, cash amortizations cannot be entirely avoided. Depending on political, social and other motivations, stronger attempts for this kind of debt reduction are even probable. In this case the resulting implication of a more regressive tax pattern may at least be alleviated, though it cannot be prevented.

A carefully constructed sinking fund can be envisaged which would cushion the intensity of such an effect. The federal government has used this instrument to a considerable extent for debt reductions;¹⁹ some municipalities also have adopted it, while the states, by and large, have made little use of it. In the postwar period, or even now, in preparation for that time, a federal sinking fund, devised on a larger scale than the present one and provided with ample means as well as methods assuring its utmost technical efficiency, might be a desirable tool of fiscal policy. Such a fund, administered on equitable principles, could exert a compensatory effect with regard to the fluctuations of the business cycle and the potential implications of debt incidence. It must be recognized, however, that its burdening effects could not be eliminated: the cash payments would still have to be made out of a given tax structure, and a different group from the principally contributing taxpayers would be at the receiving end. The sinking fund, therefore, offers no fundamental solution. It could only ease an essentially inequitable situation. For this reason, an argument could be advanced for retaining the main part of the bonded marketable debt (Treasury bonds) and for letting cash repayments with or without a sinking fund (real debt reduction) be the exception, not the rule.

A quite different incidence problem is presented by the Savings

¹⁹ The present cumulative sinking fund of the federal government has had large amounts at its disposal—nearly 10 billion dollars over the period 1921–43. Debt retirements during these years totaled 6.2 billion dollars, leaving a considerable unexpended balance. See U. S. Treasury Department, *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1943*, p. 599.

bonds, the non-marketable part of the funded federal debt. In all series (A-G) issued since 1935, over 40 billion dollars in maturity values was outstanding at the beginning of the calendar year 1945. Thus the amounts involved are considerably smaller than the 100 billion dollars or so of bonded marketable debts of all governmental levels. But the Savings bonds have more significant implications for debt incidence than the figures might indicate.

For some of these bonds we have an incidence problem at the very start, the moment the securities come into existence. This does not apply to all of them. Series A-D and G, or nearly one-third of the outstanding Savings bonds, do not have a debt incidence in the stage of the debt creation, for they are pure investment securities, even if they are not transferable, negotiable and marketable. The type of holder, the comparatively high denominations in which they are issued, the amounts purchased and acquirable by a single buyer—all these characteristics speak for the assumption that they are bought as any other investment would be acquired. But the E and F bonds, and especially the E bonds alone, which in January 1945 accounted for over 25 billion dollars in outstanding maturity values—and incidentally for only about 11 percent of the total federal debt—show a peculiar incidence in their initial phase.

These bonds are bought chiefly by the lower and lower-middle income groups, often not in entire bonds even of the smallest denomination of \$25 maturity value, but by the accumulation of Savings stamps and payroll deductions in small amounts until the sum is reached that is necessary for the acquirement of a bond. At present nearly two-thirds of the United States population possess war bonds.²⁰ This is an unprecedented spread of government security holdings. And holdings of this type cannot be

²⁰ The Secretary of the Treasury mentioned on October 7, 1944, in an address at Atlantic City, that 85 million individual Americans are owners of war bonds, and on February 11, 1945, in a radio forum conducted by the American Federation of Labor, he called attention to the fact that nearly half of all E bond purchases have been made by workers through payroll deductions.

regarded as entirely representing investments out of savings. To a large extent the E bonds mean a cut in consumption. Even if they remain fully voluntary, and cannot be considered comparable with forced loans or with the British deferred-payment system,²¹ the consumption-curbing aim, and still more, its achievement, imply a psychological if not an economic burden for a holder who would normally not have "invested" at all. He does not fall in the income brackets that are the usual source of investment funds. If he nevertheless buys bonds he may quickly become aware of the pressure this involves for him.

Two factors serve to alter this picture somewhat. One is the development of real income in the lower and lower-middle income brackets in recent years, which may allow for more saving and therefore give more of an investment aspect to the acquisition of E bonds. The other is the redemption feature. After a relatively short time of holding—60 days for E bonds (as for those in series A–D) and 6 months for F (and G) bonds—the owner is entitled to ask the government for a cash redemption. This possibility may diminish some of the burdening implications of the initial phase.

In the second phase, the interest service, a special incidence problem is presented by only a relatively small part of all outstanding Savings bonds—only by the G bonds, of which 9.9 billion dollars was outstanding in January 1945. These are current-interest obligations at 2.5 percent, and at present their service requires around 248 million dollars annually. Its incidence resembles that of the interest service on ordinary Treasury bonds: the recipients are generally in higher income groups than those that furnish a large part of the means, and consequently the regressive tendencies of the tax pattern are intensified.

The vast majority of all Savings bonds, all series except the G

²¹ In the British tax system income taxes paid by the lower income groups are regarded as forced saving, repayable after the war. On the scope of this measure see Shirras and Rostas, *op. cit.*, p. 75. It is still an open question how the repayment of these compulsory loans is going to be financed—whether by new taxes or by new loans.

bonds, are of a different kind. For them the interest accrues (2.9 percent for the A-E series, 2.53 percent for the F series), and is paid out only with the capital at maturity, 10 years after issue (12 years for the F bonds, as for the G series), or at an earlier date if the bonds are redeemed before that time. Thus the incidence aspects of the interest payments become part of the problem of the repayment.

This problem may materialize in about 1951-56, or before. Nobody can forecast how large the claims for earlier redemption will be. If demobilization and reconversion work smoothly, such demands may be smaller than is usually anticipated.²² But even if they should be very extensive, the incidence problem of the repayment would not change. It would only come into existence at an earlier date.

In any case, two ways of amortizing Savings bonds will be feasible: cash repayment out of taxes, and refunding into new securities. Cash redemption would mean an annual claim on the taxpayer by the bondholder of somewhere between 3 and 4 billion dollars, starting around 1950, in addition to the interest and other services on the remaining parts of the debt. If necessary, such cash payments could certainly be effected. And as for their incidence implications, it is just this debt category, and only this one, where it can be assumed that the security holder—at least as far as the E bonds are concerned—falls in the same or nearly the same income brackets as the taxpayer who carries a significant part of the tax burden. Consequently the cash amortization of these bonds would tend to have a compensatory effect—compensating the taxpayer for some of the regressiveness produced in the tax pattern by the financing of such cash payments. It may still be exaggerated to say that the taxpayer pays to himself

²² Up to 1944 the demands for earlier repayment were small, but during 1944 they increased. At the beginning of August 1944 there was even an excess of redemptions over new sales (*New York Sun*, August 24, 1944), but this tendency was soon reversed. All in all, around 6.4 billion dollars, or about 13 percent, of the 48 billion issued in Savings bonds since 1935 have been retired before maturity (U. S. Treasury Department, *Daily Statement*, March 1, 1945).

and therefore all potential burdens are eliminated: the lowest income group, for instance, which is burdened with a considerable amount of taxes, is not likely to own many, if any, Savings bonds. But in comparison with other types of debt there is at least a substantial indication in that direction. This applies primarily to the E and F bonds, somewhat less to the A-D series, which are held by stronger income groups; it does not apply to the G bonds, which in their investment character resemble ordinary Treasury bonds.

Even if it is granted, however, that in the category of the E and F bonds debt repayments would tend to have a compensatory effect, the fact remains that such an effect may not fully materialize for some years. And in the meantime there may be a temporary intensification of the tax pattern similar to that produced by the interest payments on ordinary Treasury bonds, and the cash amortization of those bonds. In view of the probability of such an interim period certain provisions that would tend to ease the regressive incidence may be desirable. The institution of a sinking fund, large and flexible enough to cope also with this type of debt, comes again to mind.²³

The refunding of Savings bonds into new obligations is the other method of liquidating them. This course, so far as the E series is concerned, is likely to result in a shift among holders, from lower into higher income brackets. The A-D and F series would participate in such a development only to a slight extent, because of their comparatively small outstanding amounts and their wider dispersion among stronger income groups; the G bonds, too, while they might be shifted among holders, would remain within the same or at least very similar income groups. But whatever category of Savings bonds is refunded, and into whatever form of new securities, whether Treasury bonds or Sav-

²³ As has been pointed out, for example by Alvin Johnson, "The Coming Peace Crisis," in *Social Research*, vol. 11 (September 1944) p. 308, we may have to cope with receding bond valuations after the war. In anticipation of such developments the envisaged sinking fund could be designed to be utilized also for the stabilization of bond values.

ings bonds again, only buyers looking for investments will acquire them, since all other motives for their purchase will have been removed. The incidence of such refunding actions may therefore have to some extent a corrective effect on the regressive tendencies of the tax pattern. In so far as such a shift in bond holdings materializes, the income classes bearing regressive tax loads will be relieved by the investing income groups. If there is little or no shift among income groups the refunding of Savings bonds will result in the same neutralized incidence implied in the refunding of ordinary Treasury bonds.

IV

The ways in which the incidence of debt affects the tax pattern may be briefly summarized from the foregoing analysis. In considering this relationship it must be borne in mind that it has a direct bearing on the development of the national income. Tax patterns with pronounced regressive tendencies impair the growth of national income and the equity of its distribution. And if the debt incidence intensifies regressiveness, these harmful tendencies will become still more pronounced, while if it diminishes regressive inclinations it may go a long way toward counteracting such adverse influences. It must be stressed, however, that these observations refer to tendencies rather than to facts. Therefore all conclusions remain tentative.

The various aspects, discussed above, of the influence of debt incidence on the tax pattern revealed, essentially, differences of degree and differences of direction. Favorable, improving influences were noted, and adverse, harmful ones.

First, there is the *neutralized* effect, which leaves the tax pattern as a whole almost untouched. This applies to the unfunded debt in all its phases, and also to the ordinary Treasury bonds and to a large part of the Savings bonds (especially series A-D and G) in their initial and refunding phases. So far as the initial phase, the acquisition, is concerned, this effect is due to the pure investment character of these transactions. As regards the interest and

repayment phases of the unfunded debt, the largely neutralized effect is due to the relatively small amounts involved, and to the fact that most of this type of debt is merely refinanced within similar income groups.

Second, debt incidence has an *intensifying* effect in the interest service and possible cash amortization of ordinary Treasury bonds, in the interest service on series G Savings bonds, and in the cash repayment of series A-D and G Savings bonds—as a result of the fact that in these cases payments are made to predominantly higher income groups by predominantly lower income groups. The same effect may be attributed to the initial phase, the acquisition, of those bonds that are not bought primarily out of savings, that is, especially, some of the series E Savings bonds, though any effects of this stage may be subsequently altered, of course, by the repayment phase.

Third, a *compensatory* influence of debt incidence on the tax pattern is traceable where some of its regressive aspects are offset by corresponding benefits accruing to the same groups of taxpayers. This situation occurs in the cash repayments (plus interest) of E and F Savings bonds, though unless there is extensive redemption of these bonds before their maturity, such a compensatory effect would not occur for some years. In addition, the lack of synchronization at the paying and receiving ends of the process may qualify this statement: as taxpayers and bondholders people do not make payments and receive payments at the same time.

Finally, debt incidence has a *corrective* effect on the tax pattern when higher income groups ease the regressive burden shouldered by lower income brackets. This situation may occur particularly if E Savings bonds are refunded into new issues of an investment character.

These observations suggest that favorable consideration might be accorded to the unfunded debt and to investment purchases of the bonded debt. This would amount to a retention, after the war, of a comparatively large unfunded debt, and at the same time

an emphasis on investment aspects of the funded debt, for instance, a change of character of the Savings bonds into pure investment-oriented securities. It is true that this would later raise the problem of the intensifying effect produced by the interest service and possible cash repayment of purely investment securities, but the institution of a sinking fund might alleviate some of the seriousness of this problem.

All these considerations rest on the assumption of an unchanged tax pattern and the retainment of approximately the same interest structure as prevails today. Any appreciable alterations in these factors would immediately affect the implications of the present debt pattern.

(New York City)

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NAZI LEISURE TIME PROGRAM

BY ERNEST HAMBURGER

As plenipotentiary for the total war effort of Germany, Paul Joseph Goebbels found it necessary, even before the Third Reich was annihilated by the Allied armies, to start with his own hands the liquidation of some of his most cherished propagandistic institutions. In order to drain the last reserves of manpower for military needs, he had to dissolve institutions of the Nazi party itself. To this necessity the leisure time organization known as "Strength through Joy" became a victim. The termination of its last remaining activities was announced in August 1944, and the organization appears to have been disbanded in October of that year. Thus after less than eleven years of existence one of the most conspicuous creations of Nazism disappeared, thereby providing another annotation to the proclamation of a Nazi millennium, and ending a life shorter than that which even the institutions of the Weimar republic had achieved.

Organization and Background

The Strength through Joy organization (*Kraft durch Freude*) was created in November 1933 as an affiliate of the German Labor Front.¹ It was modeled after Mussolini's *Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro*, which Hitler had ordered to be studied in 1933, and for the first weeks of its existence was even referred to by the same name in German: *Nach der Arbeit*. It soon outstripped its fascist predecessor, however, largely because of the range of its activities and the masses of people that it reached. Increasing year by year, it was hailed by the Nazis as a unique phenomenon.

¹ See the author's article, "The German Labor Front," in *Monthly Labor Review* (November 1944) pp. 932-44 (reprinted as Serial No. R. 1706, U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics).

In 1936, on the occasion of the Olympic games in Berlin, when representatives of leisure time associations of most nations met and founded an international leisure time organization, with its office in Berlin and under complete Nazi control, Strength through Joy reached its highest point of international attention and consideration.

Strength through Joy had no members, but was merely an office organization. Throughout the years it tended toward an ever closer connection with the German Labor Front, and finally became one of its departments in 1938. Of the 59 subdivisions of the Labor Front, 6 were branches of Strength through Joy. Its importance was so highly rated that Robert Ley, Nazi Party Chief of Staff and Reich Leader of the Labor Front, took over Strength through Joy in addition to his other duties—the only Labor Front affiliate or department to be directed by him personally. In 1942, because of the strain imposed on manpower and civilian life by war reverses, Labor Front activities had to be sharply reduced and only 10 subdivisions survived, but Strength through Joy was one of them, although its activities were sharply curtailed and were concentrated mainly on maintaining the morale of the army. Of the 36,000 paid Labor Front officials, almost 6,000 were in the service of Strength through Joy, and of the 2,000,000 unpaid petty functionaries, between 200,000 and 300,000 worked for Strength through Joy, compensated by prestige and small favors. The organization was represented on all regional and local staffs of the Labor Front, and also on the staffs of the chief stewards of plants and shops.

Hitler proclaimed as the primary aim of the leisure time organization the strengthening of the body and soul of the German people: "I can make policy only with a people who do not lose their calm." To attain its purposes, Strength through Joy was to serve not labor alone, but the entire nation: first, those individually organized in the Labor Front (employers, employees and the urban middle class); second, the "collective Labor Front members" (persons organized in other associations who were

admitted to Strength through Joy by agreements with the Labor Front); and finally, wives and other household members. Nobody was forgotten. Among the associations whose members were admitted on the basis of special agreements were the National Food Estate, the professions, the civil servants and even the "National Association of Hard-of-Hearing Germans."² About 20 million "individual" Labor Front members, 5 million "collective" members, and about 12 million household associates—together 37 million persons—were the potential beneficiaries of Strength through Joy in Germany proper. Including the "Greater German" territory their number may have amounted to between 40 and 45 million in 1939.

As an affiliate and later a department of the German Labor Front, Strength through Joy was organizationally and administratively subordinate to the Nazi party; moreover, only party members could become officials. Thus its prestige and achievements redounded to the party's credit. Officials of government agencies, such as the Ministry of Labor or others, had no supervision or control over the leisure time organization, and no rights in regard to it. The Nazis considered Strength through Joy one of their most important accomplishments for the "leadership of man," and the party jealously monopolized it. By lavishly offering benefits to the masses, Strength through Joy was one of the main instruments for obtaining their adherence to the Nazi party in its fight for totalitarian control over the other powers of the Nazi regime: army, bureaucracy, great landowners and heavy industry.

The offerings of Strength through Joy can be classified in several broad categories, which will be discussed presently at greater length. The activities designated as "Beauty of Labor" were concerned with the work place in the factory, its surroundings, and the promotion of healthy and clean working conditions by shop improvements. This part of the program was extended in the

² Kraft durch Freude (Saxony), *Monatsprogrammhefte* (July 1938) third cover page.

direction of leisure activities through the installation and organization of "work community" rooms, stadia and plant swimming pools. Among the leisure activities proper, sports and all kinds of games played an important part, including even such sports as lawn tennis and horseback riding, which had always been regarded as expensive diversions for the upper classes only. Another part of the organization concerned itself with adult education, including courses and lectures on various subjects presented from the point of view of Nazi doctrine. Still another provided "cultural" performances and other forms of evening entertainment: operas, theater performances, concerts, movies and the like. This division of the organization had cars and trains to bring performances to rural districts. It also organized visits to museums and to exhibitions, promoted folk dances and similar reminiscences of the Germanic past, and beautified hamlets as "model villages." A further type of activity was the weekend and vacation trips; hiking, boating, skating and swimming excursions of several days were organized, and longer trips of from one to three weeks. The latest offering of the organization, the Strength through Joy automobile, was introduced in 1937 as Hitler's own idea, and was intended, according to its originators, to become the vehicle of the German masses.

In view of this variety and scope of activities, it might be expected that the expenditures of the Strength through Joy department were very great. But although its turnover exceeded 2 billion marks yearly, the department itself contributed a very small amount to the work of the organization, varying between 15 and 20 million in addition to about 25 million for the salary of the officials, both amounts coming from the dues of the Labor Front members, totaling 400 to 500 million marks. Only the devices of government in a totalitarian society furnish the clue to the enigma of these figures. The administrative buildings and offices were "taken over" from the unions. The staffs of the Labor Front shop stewards had to be housed in decent office rooms by the entrepreneurs. "Roll calls," held at short intervals in

the plants under the chairmanship of the chief stewards and in the presence of the entire work community, and compulsory meetings of the cells and blocs in factories and apartment houses, offered innumerable occasions for verbal propaganda. Powerful channels of written propaganda were the Labor Front periodicals; most of these were distributed free of charge, and some were subscribed to by Labor Front officials for the entire work community and paid for by deductions from pay checks. No expenditure was involved in all this.

To finance the activities themselves, corporations were urged to provide in their budgets for yearly contributions to *Strength through Joy*, and they complied with such requests; it was a test of their loyalty to the regime and a condition for obtaining government orders. Officers of *Beauty of Labor*, carrying the weight of Nazi authority, toured the big and medium-size factories, planning with employers and shop stewards shop improvements and their financing. The costs of material, at least, had to be borne by the entrepreneurs; often all or part of the labor was done by the workers, through unpaid overtime work. For Labor Front sports, favored in spare time between working hours and devoted not to record achievements but to improving the health and vigor of the average man and woman, sports teachers were made available through the offices of the Nazi sports leader. Concerts, intended to awaken a military spirit and enthusiasm for the restored German army, were given by military bands.

When members had to pay for trips organized by *Strength through Joy*, or for operas, theater performances and the like, great and successful efforts were made to bring prices down to a level within the reach of the masses. Through organizations of theatergoers *Strength through Joy* guaranteed the theaters a sure though not very remunerative mass public. Negotiations with railroads, which were public property, and with associations of hotel proprietors in resorts, enabled *Strength through Joy* to offer excursions far below the price for individual trips. Savings books and stamps, attesting deductions from paychecks by the

personnel offices of the plants, facilitated the accumulation, in two to five years, of the amount necessary for a trip. Efficient and politically reliable workers could even hope to obtain grants from their employers, supplemented from funds of the Labor Front, for one of the more costly trips—a shrewd combination of political control, work incentive and reward. And finally, when clever devices and persuasion did not suffice, compulsion did its part. As late as 1937, when the first violent antagonisms between employers and Labor Front had abated and “social peace” had been established in conformity with Hitler’s watchword of 1936, the entire press headlined the case of an employer sent to a concentration camp because he did not comply with Beauty of Labor requirements.

In all this the Nazi regime showed that it understood the great importance of leisure activities in a period of drastic economic and political change. At the same time, however, it did not work in empty space but followed the national and international trend of leisure activities in our time. To a considerable extent it merely continued earlier activities on a larger scale, concentrating, bureaucratizing and Nazifying them. Germany had great numbers of sport associations before the Nazi period, founded by young and old, men and women, middle class and labor, Protestants and Catholics. For a long time the state governments, city councils and private associations had promoted hiking and swimming, had built youth hostels and playgrounds, outdoor and indoor swimming pools, and had organized resort centers for the underprivileged.” Berlin has more recreational activities for the poor man with a family than any large city I know of,” wrote a reporter of the *New York Sun* in 1932, and two years earlier another American observer, a high ranking official in the National Recreation Association, asserted that “while in Berlin I visited numerous playgrounds, gymnasias, outdoor and indoor swimming baths, stadia and other recreational grounds. Never have I seen any better, or for that matter as well laid out, equipped and supervised, and even more important than this, never have I seen boys

and girls happier or more physically fit or taking more joy and pleasure in their exercise and play."³

Theatergoers' associations were more than forty years old when Hitler took power. In 1929 the oldest organization, alone, included 284 associations with 500,000 members, filled 5 or 6 million theater seats annually which would otherwise have been left vacant, and provided for 1,400 performances in 250 localities which were without regular theaters. All big and medium-size town governments had created adult educational classes and libraries. Similarly, trade unions of all orientations had strongly encouraged cultural and recreational activities, and had built rest and relaxation houses and organized inexpensive trips. In 1933, in one of the last surveys of trade union activities under the republic, Theodor Leipart, leader of the German free trade unions, stressed the work of the unions in promoting a worthy use of the increased leisure time gained through shorter working hours: "Through libraries and periodicals, numerous performances of every kind, lectures, concerts and theatrical performances, the unions opened to the worker access to the intellectual world of the German nation."⁴ In this field collective action, traditionally cherished in Germany, received a strong incentive from the impoverishment of the middle class by the lost war and the runaway inflation, and from the republican government's concern for the wellbeing of the workers, who needed guidance and lacked individual means for a rewarding and healthy use of leisure time.

Nazism came to power in a period when this transformation of social life was in full swing, when new masses had begun to enter the cultural and recreational life of the nation and had adopted new collective devices for doing so. Thus Strength through Joy activities have to be understood not only as a development peculiar to Nazism but also as a forceful continuation of trends

³ Gustavus T. Kirby, "Recreation in Germany," in *Playground and Recreation* (October 1930) p. 408.

⁴ Theodor Leipart, "Leistungen der Gewerkschaften für Volk und Staat," in *Soziale Praxis*, February 23, 1933, p. 230.

already existing in Germany. This dual character has been obscured by the Nazi insistence on the originality of all Strength through Joy accomplishments; and it has been obscured also by the attitude of sincere anti-Nazis who deny any links between pre-Nazi and Nazi Germanys and any social value of Strength through Joy activities.

Specific Activities

One of the most publicized activities of Strength through Joy was the weekend excursions and collective vacation arrangements, intended to enable workers to get away from home, relax, and become acquainted with their country. Persons who had never left their place of birth, or who had no knowledge of any place except the town in which they worked, were shown the beautiful countryside, the beaches, and the forests. Fishermen visited the mountains, mountain folk went to the bathing places; romantic cruises were made to the Portuguese Azores and the Norwegian fjords, to Italy and her African colonies, and elsewhere; life on board ship gave the workers a pleasant sense of leisure and forgetfulness. Politically, the trips to Italy, which became the most frequent of all cruises, were intended to "pave the way to a great friendship between the folk forces of two young nations," united against "the old, rotten, liberal, democratic Europe."⁵

About 10 million members of the Labor Front were said by the Strength through Joy propagandists to have been sent on trips in 1937 and in 1938. According to a detailed account published retrospectively in 1940, in an official publication of the Labor Front,⁶ the number of trips and hiking excursions during 1934-38 was as shown below (in thousands). No later figures have been published. It is certain, however, that the peak was reached in 1938. At the outbreak of the war, in September 1939, trips and excursions were suspended in order to relieve the railroads.⁷

⁵ See *Arbeitertum*, November 1, 1937, pp. 6-9, April 15, 1938, pp. 11-14, August 1, 1939, p. 7.

⁶ Deutsche Arbeitsfront, *Fundamente des Seiges* (Berlin 1940) p. 355.

⁷ Deutsche Arbeitsfront, *Die deutsche Arbeitsfront im Kriege* (Berlin 1940) p. 31.

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	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
Vacation trips				1,372	1,447
Voyages	61	120	118	130	131
Short trips	2,120	5,737	6,488	6,819	6,811
Hiking excursions	99	403	1,065	1,605	1,937

The Strength through Joy ships were used as hospital ships, as transports to occupied Norway and for the transfer of German settlers from the Baltic countries; the resorts were reserved for sick and wounded soldiers. In 1940 only unimportant remainders of the work of the office "Hiking, Trips, Vacations" were left, and in 1941 even these disappeared.

The quoted figures, around 10 million for 1937 and for 1938, must, however, be taken with caution. Another official Labor Front publication, issued in the same year, claims for 1938 "10 million, which means an increase of 50 percent over 1937,"⁸ thus implying for the latter year a figure of less than 7 million travelers. But even according to the higher estimates, in both 1937 and 1938 it was the "short trips," which were actually normal or prolonged weekend excursions of two to four days, and were sometimes listed as such in regional Strength through Joy surveys, which constituted, together with hiking, the vast majority of the trips—no less than 85 percent of the total. And such excursions, while they may have been more numerous and more organized than they were in pre-Hitler days, did not constitute anything unusual. Hiking excursions had been indulged in for years by all youth organizations, and had been given strong moral and financial support by the state and municipal governments.

According to the figures presented above, those who made vacation trips of seven or more days (including cruises) numbered 1.5 million in 1937 and less than 1.6 million in 1938; this relatively small proportion of real vacation trips is reflected also in the reports of individual districts. In republican Germany, however, such longer trips for workers, arranged by the trade unions, had hardly exceeded the stage of planning; the number of such

⁸ Deutsche Arbeitsfront, *Kalender der deutschen Arbeit* (Berlin 1940) p. 53.

trips organized by the unions was insignificant, the period following World War I being unfavorable to large projects of this kind. Thus tens of thousands of wage-earners owed to Strength through Joy the enjoyable experience of their first vacation trip; according to regional statistics wage-earners constituted between 30 and 42 percent of all participants in these longer journeys.⁹ But the others were salaried employees, public officials, soldiers, shopkeepers, and their wives—not only persons in the lowest income brackets but also those in middle brackets—and many of the latter can be assumed to have made pleasure trips before the Hitler period. For them the organization worked as a successful mass travel agency but not, as was claimed, as an introduction to a new way of life.

The figures indicate that the number of manual workers participating in the longer trips was something over 500,000 both in 1937 and in 1938. In comparison with earlier conditions this is a remarkably high figure; in comparison with the total of about 16 million manual workers it is not so arresting. It means that the average wage-earner had the prospect of making a vacation trip in every thirtieth year, while the average salaried employee (totaling 4 million) could expect such a trip in every tenth year. The chance of a wage-earner's participating in one of the spectacular trips to foreign countries was too slight to be expressed in a number of years in the range of a man's life; between 1934 and 1939 hardly more than 1 percent of manual labor obtained the privilege of making a cruise.

It should not be overlooked, however, that there was an important subjective effect in the mere existence of a possibility which

⁹ Kraft durch Freude (Rhein-Main), *Vier Jahre Kraft durch Freude* (1938) p. 73 gives the figure as 42.4 percent for Hessen; *N.S. Sozialpolitik* (Berlin) June 25, 1938, p. 272, mentions 39 percent for Berlin; Kraft durch Freude (Saxony), *Monatsprogrammhefte* (December 1936) mentions 32.01 percent for the state of Saxony; Deutsche Arbeitsfront (Auslandsorganisation), *Der Deutsche im Ausland* (Hamburg 1938) p. 212, mentions 30 percent in reference to a trip to Madeira. The 58 percent of manual workers claimed by the Labor Front (*Soziale Praxis*, August 1, 1939, p. 911) refers to all trips, including weekend excursions, in which manual workers had always been strongly represented.

had hitherto seemed inconceivable to any member of the working class. This is evidenced by the propaganda value attributed to it. The Labor Front periodicals dwelled upon the vacation trips and cruises more than on any other topic of social policy; and since the Labor Front propagandists based their work on careful observations, gathered in the small units of cells and blocs, these trips must have remarkably impressed labor and far exceeded the effect of other Strength through Joy work.¹⁰

The "Evening Leisure" office of Strength through Joy organized a wide variety of activities whose purpose was primarily propagandistic, with a gloss of general entertainment. Operas and operettas, plays and concerts, cabaret performances and movies were presented to large audiences. Popular music and guided trips through museums were offered. Often people gathered for an evening entertainment of dancing, shows, recitals and a short speech.

These latter meetings were organized by employers anxious to prove their loyalty to the regime and their socialist and comradely spirit toward their employees. Along with Labor Front officials and functionaries they addressed the workers, telling them of the performances of the Hitler regime and the duties of the work communities. On these and other occasions old costumes and rituals of the former guilds were sometimes shown;¹¹ folk dances were performed, and in rural districts presentations of the old peasant life were given. The meetings of the work communities were easiest to organize and had the largest attendance: the employees were frequently compelled to be present, and in any case they customarily attended, as absence led to embarrassing questions if not serious troubles. Expressed in figures of attendance, these meetings constituted one-fourth of the activities of the "Evening Leisure" office, and in some districts even more;

¹⁰ On the propaganda of the Labor Front and of Strength through Joy see the author's article, "German Labor Front Press: A Nazi Propaganda Experiment," in *Journalism Quarterly* (September 1944) pp. 243-55.

¹¹ The meetings of this kind are therefore classified as "folkdom performances" in certain surveys; in others they are listed separately.

in the state of Saxony the proportion was one-third, and in Silesia one-half.¹²

According to official figures¹³ the number of performances presented by the Evening Leisure office in 1938, the last full pre-war year, and the number of attendants were as shown below.

	<i>Performances</i>	<i>Attendants</i>
Folkdom performances	54,813	13,666,015
Concerts	5,291	2,515,598
Operas, operettas	12,407	6,639,067
Plays	19,523	7,478,633
Cabarets	7,921	3,518,033
Varieties	10,983	4,462,140
Movies	3,586	857,402
Exhibitions	555	1,595,516
Guided tours (museums)	676	58,472
Miscellaneous	15,084	11,118,636
Entertainments for highway workers	13,589	2,658,155
	<hr/> 144,428	<hr/> 54,567,667

The figures are certainly not wholly reliable, for another official Labor Front source mentions only 44 million attendants.¹⁴ But even the larger figures mean that potential Strength through Joy patrons could have attended, on the average, only slightly more than one performance during the year. In reality, of course, each person was counted as many times as he attended, and thus many did not attend at all. The 14 million attendants at operas and plays may actually have been 1.5 to 2 million persons who attended performances seven to ten times in the year; certainly the few hundred thousands who were busy at the "Hitler highways" were entertained several times. Thus the figures, impressive as they seem, indicate that Strength through Joy did not succeed in interesting the entire adult population even in this part of its

¹² *Fundamente des Sieges* (cited above) p. 325; Kraft durch Freude (Saxony), *Monatsprogrammhefte* (December 1938) pp. 7-9; Ernst Obst, "Die N.S. Gemeinschaft Kraft durch Freude," in *Schlesische Monatshefte* (December 1937) p. 446.

¹³ *Fundamente des Sieges* (cited above) pp. 334-35.

¹⁴ *Kalender der deutschen Arbeit* (cited above) p. 53.

activities: many millions remained indifferent and stayed away, while other millions were satisfied to take part in only one work community meeting or one of the miscellaneous entertainments. In regard to the other categories of Evening Leisure activities, it seems safe to say that probably a minority of Labor Front members and their wives attended once, and only a very small minority attended more than once. Attendance at operas and plays may have doubled in 1938 in comparison to 1929, but possibly or even probably it would have come near to that if the work of the free theater organizations had continued normally.

The character of the performances was determined not by the inclinations of the individuals or by their educational aspirations but, in general, by bureaucratic decisions. Thus the figures prove nothing regarding the receptivity, appreciation or enthusiasm of the patrons. To give an example, in Silesia 462 concerts given in 1936, with 51,000 attendants, increased in the following year to 819, with 316,000 attendants,¹⁵ but the striking increase was due mainly to an agreement reached between the Labor Front and the army, concerning concerts to be given by military bands in Silesian plants; 445 such concerts were given before 144,000 workers.

In regard to the "Beauty of Labor" activities of Strength through Joy, it should be pointed out that shop improvements were not new in Germany when Hitler took power. They had been made first for health and safety, then for recreational purposes. The resistance of many employers to such expenditures had been softened under the influence of progressing social thinking and the fight of the trade unions. Thus the Beauty of Labor office, which was under the chairmanship of Albert Speer, Minister of Armament and Ammunition from 1942, found it necessary to explain to labor what was new in its work. "Sanitary installations, stadia, lawns, etc., are demands of before yesterday, we do not contest it." But a new feature, it was explained, was the spirit in which Beauty of Labor worked; it was inspired not by the

¹⁵ Obst, *op. cit.*, p. 445.

desire to make the worker "feel better" or to help him "earn more money," but by the idea of the work community, without which Beauty of Labor would be a ridiculous utopia.¹⁶ Actually the "work community," an outgrowth of the Nazi dictatorship, was nothing but a fiction created and maintained by orders of the Labor Front bureaucracy, and it remained a utopia during the Nazi regime.

The number of Beauty of Labor operations during 1934-38, and the expenditures on them, have been summarized in three Labor Front publications, all issued at the beginning of the war or shortly before; these rather contradictory sets of figures are shown below.¹⁷ Discrepancies in the figures of Source 3 may be

	Source 1	Source 2	Source 3
Factory inspections	67,000	almost 40,000	59,503
Workroom improvements	26,000	23,000	20,741
Lawns, factory courtyards, etc.	17,000	10,000	13,122
Washrooms and dressing rooms	24,000	15,000	20,455
Restrooms and lunchrooms	18,000	19,000	15,595
Sport installations	3,000	2,200	2,107
Comrade houses	?	1,200	2,557
Total expenditures	900,000,000 RM.	over 600,000,000 RM.	780,799,732 RM.

partly ascribed to the fact that that publication covers only the period through June 1938, while the others extend through the end of that year; on most items, however, the figures in Source 3 are not the lowest of the three reports. The discrepancies become still more striking when these figures are compared with those in other no less official sources¹⁸—further evidence of the lack of reliability of all Labor Front statistics.

But even if reliable figures of this sort were available, their significance would still be uncertain. They include not only new installations but also improvements and normal repair work. The

¹⁶ Kraft durch Freude (Saxony), *Monatsprogrammhefte* (August 1936) p. 35.

¹⁷ Source 1: *Fundamente des Sieges* (cited above) p. 325; Source 2: *Kalender der deutschen Arbeit* (cited above) p. 53; Source 3: Anatol v. Hübner, *Die N.S. Gemeinschaft Kraft durch Freude* (Berlin 1939) p. 28.

¹⁸ See the generally lower figures of Gerhard Starcke, "Die deutsche Arbeitsfront," in Karl Peppeler, *Deutsche Arbeitskunde* (Leipzig 1940) p. 183; Starcke was a leading Labor Front propagandist.

extension of shop improvements under the Hitler regime—certainly attributable partly to the inspections by Beauty of Labor officials, the pressure exerted by them, and the higher earnings of the corporations as a result of the armament boom—cannot be checked against or compared with former accomplishments in this field.

The reports of the companies, which are more reliable than those of the Labor Front, have always been reluctant to disclose the expenditures for social work, and they are fully silent with regard to the details of such expenses—a fact continuously complained of by the magazine *Soziale Praxis*, which for a long time preserved a relatively high standing even under the Nazi regime. Thus investigation of these sources does not reveal very much. Moreover, they include not only the normal contributions to retired, needy or sick workers, to vacation homes and worker settlements, to work libraries and Strength through Joy, but also the contributions to activities of the party or its affiliates, to families of servicemen and to other such causes.¹⁹ Such voluntary expenditures, at times strongly promoted by the Labor Front, amounted in some large companies to an average of 6 percent of the total amount of wages, and were much lower or even insignificant in medium and small companies. Within these sums the amounts spent for Beauty of Labor may be estimated at fractions of 1 percent of the total amount of wages in large corporations. Such amounts do not stand out conspicuously in comparison with expenditures for similar purposes in former boom periods in Germany or other industrial countries.

In combination or singly the activities described above doubtless contributed to overcoming the distrust of large sections of German labor regarding Hitler's economic aims—aims that had been branded as reactionary by the German Left during his fight for power. But this work had its failures too. The greatest

¹⁹ See Deutsche Arbeitsfront, *Zusätzliche Gefolgschaftsversorgung* (Berlin 1938) pp. 4-9, and the numerous analyses of company reports in *Soziale Praxis* between 1935 and 1939.

failures were the attempt to organize adult education, and the launching of the so-called people's automobile.

Counting all lectures ever held by Nazi party and Labor Front bosses in plants and shops, the propagandists could boast of impressive successes in the field of adult education. They claimed about 70,000 performances with 4 million attendants in 1937, and more than 100,000 with 6.3 million attendants in 1938.²⁰ There is no doubt that Nazi lecturers were busy traveling, and that no negligible number of workers were detained for an hour after work, or complied with a request that they remain, in order that they might hear an evening lecture on a racial, political or economic problem presented in the light of the Nazi doctrine. There is reason to believe, however, that the unwillingness of the workers to read Labor Front newspapers, which was in the sharpest contrast to the skyrocketing circulation of these journals, applied also to the cascade of verbal propaganda.²¹

In contrast with such compulsory or quasi-compulsory participation, the voluntary attendance at adult education classes was poor. In 1933 and 1934 the Nazis destroyed the municipal adult educational institutions (*Volkshochschulen*) which had flourished under the Weimar republic and which they deeply distrusted because of the democratic spirit which had prevailed in such organizations. They considered it necessary to exercise the closest possible watch over adult education, and to make it subject to the party itself. Therefore they created the institution known as "German Popular Education" (*Deutsches Volksbildungswerk*), and made it a section of Strength through Joy. This assured the party's control of all adult education without excluding the cooperation of the Ministry of Education and the municipalities, though these bodies were confined to a secondary position. As late as 1937 a high Labor Front official declared it to be "a terrible judgment" on the former educational system "that we still lack teachers who

²⁰ *Kalender der deutschen Arbeit* (cited above) p. 53.

²¹ See this writer's article, "German Labor Front Press" (cited above) pp. 250, 251, 254.

would be able to educate our youth in the spirit of National Socialism without making concessions to the past." This significant statement sufficiently explains the complete incorporation of adult education into the party's orbit.²²

But the number of persons enrolled in popular educational classes was far from impressive: 221,000 in 1937 and 205,000 in 1938.²³ This is not only a decrease in one year, but also a steep decline in comparison with the earlier successes of municipal and private teaching institutions and with the classes organized by trade unions and educational associations. The decline from the pre-Hitler period was particularly important in the ranks of wage-earners, of whom 40,000 were enrolled in 1937 and 42,000 in 1938, meaning that in every 400 wage-earners only one attended Nazi adult classes. Among salaried employees, with an attendance record of 58,000 and 72,000 for the two years, the response was stronger.

The failure of Nazi adult education is strikingly exemplified by figures on the district of Silesia, where there had been flourishing institutions in this field before the Hitler period and where the trade unions had organized important educational work. In Silesia, with more than 4.5 million inhabitants, only 31,701 students were enrolled in 1937. The various vocational groups constituted the following percentages of the total: ²⁴ wage-earners 21, salaried employees 31, public officials 14, shopkeepers 7, independent craftsmen 14, others 13. The subjects taught in the classes were mainly political history, the National Socialist way of life, racial knowledge, colonial policy, military and civilian defense, health protection, economics, and technology. In view of the fact that the Hitler doctrine was common to all instruction and was stressed in all classes, the poor showing disclosed by the figures of attendance may be considered one of the few encourag-

²² Quotation from Gerhard Starcke, in *Arbeitertum*, April 15, 1937, p. 4. See also *Soziale Praxis*, April 15, 1938, pp. 493-98; Heinrich Guthmann, "Krieg und Kultur im neuen Deutschland," in *Geist der Zeit* (May 1940) p. 263.

²³ *Fundamente des Sieges* (cited above) p. 343.

²⁴ Obst, *op. cit.*, p. 447.

ing factors to contemplate with regard to the shaping of Germany's future.

In 1937, in a sensational proclamation, Hitler promised the German people that he would make available to them a technically excellent automobile (the *Volkswagen*) which the working population and the lower middle class could afford. At that time there were only 1.1 million passenger cars in Germany, which means 1.6 cars to every 100 inhabitants, a proportion far behind that of Great Britain and France, not to mention the United States. It was estimated that 6 or 7 million persons would acquire the new folk automobile in the near future.

The Labor Front built the *Volkswagenwerk* in Fallersleben, near Brunswick, with a capital of 200 million marks taken from its funds, and it put the Strength through Joy organization in charge of the propaganda and sale of the car. The price was fixed at 990 marks, about half the price of the next cheapest car, and it could be paid in instalments. The purpose was threefold: to speed up Germany's motorization in preparation for the planned war; to show that technological progress could best be exploited by Nazi devices of production and distribution; and to enable the masses to acquire a car, previously an opportunity only for the upper classes. Here again is evidence of the way in which the Nazis interrelated their social measures and their preparation for war. In the Nazi propaganda the car was hailed as a "socialist and technical miracle" and a proof that socialism had been achieved in Nazi Germany.²⁵ Nothing is more revealing of the distortion of traditional notions by Nazi propaganda than this playing up of the Strength through Joy car as a socialist accomplishment.

Soon, however, the jokers began to become evident. It was made clear that the instalments had to be paid in advance and not, as announced previously, after delivery. Then the buyers

²⁵ *Arbeitertum*, June 15, 1938, pp. 5-7, and September 1, 1938, pp. 5-9; *Soziale Praxis*, June 15, 1938, pp. 731-32; *Deutscher Volkswirt*, June 3, 1938, pp. 1733-34; August 4, 1939, pp. 2171-72, and August 11, 1939, p. 2244; Justus Wilhelm Hedemann, *Deutsches Wirtschaftsrecht* (Berlin 1939) p. 402.

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were informed that some hundred more marks had to be paid in advance for liability, fire and theft insurance to cover the first two years, and for delivery of the car. The costs of a garage, of gasoline, repairs and the like, began to be discussed, and it was estimated that they would be higher than the weekly instalment payments. Strength through Joy offered no solution to this problem, and it became doubtful that the masses of purchasers would be financially able to use the car, once they had bought it. Of the 250,000 buyers listed in the summer of 1939, about 150,000 were paying in weekly instalments; they would have had to wait five years before acquiring their cars. Only the remaining 100,000—mostly party and Labor Front officials, who were in a position to pay at once the whole or the greater part of the amount—could hope to obtain the car in 1939.

The outbreak of the war relieved Strength through Joy of the necessity of confessing one of its biggest failures and frauds. Delivery was then postponed for the duration of the war, but nobody was entitled to cease his instalment payments. From the point of view of war preparation, however, the Strength through Joy plant and car were a success; the car "renders excellent service at the front."²⁶ The final revelation on all this was made recently by the British: "In the middle of June [1944] our agents discovered that the famous people's car or *Volkswagen* factory near Hanover was, in fact, one of the main assembly plants for the flying bomb. Our bombers were sent out and the factory was totally destroyed."²⁷

After the outbreak of war Strength through Joy changed its character and became a war agency, like the whole Labor Front. Its traditional activities rapidly declined. For reasons already mentioned, arrangements for trips and excursions ceased, though several beach, mountain and forest resorts were maintained, for workers needing rest and recuperation. The heavy strain of

²⁶ *Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, January 1, 1942.

²⁷ British Information Service, New York, *Report on the Flying Bomb* (September 1944) p. 11.

longer working hours and exhausting working methods put an end to the organization of evening leisure activities, for "leisure time in the evening must be left free for the working man and his family";²⁸ offerings of plays, concerts and the like declined slightly in the first years of the war, then heavily, after the reverses suffered in the Russian campaign in 1942. Beauty of Labor had to be suspended because of shortage of material. Adult education concentrated on German classes in the French, Polish and Czech territories incorporated into "Greater Germany." For some time sports activities successfully resisted any sharp curtailment,²⁹ but in 1943 they too were generally ended. Robert Ley's "plan of war organization of the German Labor Front," of January 1942, declared that "henceforth Strength through Joy must carry on only tasks that are necessary to the war effort," and that its whole work must be made subject to the principle that "a social policy with a peacetime orientation would be senseless and even prejudicial at present. It is impossible to allow trains to run carrying workers on vacations, and so it is with all other branches. The German Labor Front is now undergoing its baptism by fire, and it faces its members not as a giving but as a demanding agency."³⁰

Thus in the last years of its life Strength through Joy devoted itself mainly to the army. By agreement with the German High Command it took over "the whole cultural care of the army, with the exception of motion pictures," and in 1940 entertainments for the army amounted to 80 percent, in 1941 to almost 90 percent, of its total activities.³¹ Strength through Joy followed the army everywhere to the occupied countries. For 1940 it reported 180,000 performances for the armed forces, with 50 million attendants, and for 1941, 500,000 with 167 million. It also worked in the hospitals, introduced sports for convalescents and sent theater trains and orchestras to impress the population of the

²⁸ *Deutscher Volkswirt*, May 1, 1942, p. 1004.

²⁹ *Völkischer Beobachter*, April 14, 1942.

³⁰ *Deutscher Volkswirt*, No. 26, 1942, p. 843.

³¹ *Arbeitertum*, December 15, 1940, p. 2; *Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, January 1, 1942; *Deutscher Volkswirt*, No. 26, 1942, p. 843.

occupied countries. Another aspect of its wartime activities was its work in the camps of foreign workers, such camps numbering 8,000 in 1943, under the charge of the Labor Front; libraries were established, excursions were organized in the neighborhood, and the usual performances were shown.

Conclusions

In five years Strength through Joy was stripped of one after the other of its original features. But what, in an overall view, did it bring to the German people?

The Nazi regime did not do away with all former social accomplishments, as has been suggested by those who have confused the Nazis with reactionaries of the old school. The Nazis were well aware that in an industrialized society their aims could not be fulfilled unless they maintained certain social standards and satisfied certain social aspirations. Full employment, arrived at by total war preparation, and leisure time accomplishments, made possible by means of totalitarian government, were twin outgrowths of Nazi labor policy. They were conceived not in the interest of the individual, but as indispensable political and social factors in a successful execution of the militarist policy of the regime.

The trips sponsored by Strength through Joy, and especially the vacation cruises, were a new and highly appreciated achievement of the Nazi leisure time organization. Also a new development was the Strength through Joy automobile, which, however, did not materialize. Sports, excursions, shop improvements and evening activities, which had been highly developed before the Hitler regime, were developed still further under the Nazis; sports were particularly stressed, and activities in this field were considerably superior to earlier accomplishments. Adult education, on the other hand, retrogressed considerably. The scope of all these activities, however, seems to have been smaller than is generally assumed. The Nazi statistics are distorted and greatly exaggerated. But even according to the published figures the

number of persons actually reached by Strength through Joy was less impressive than appears on the surface.

Under the sociological conditions that prevailed in Germany before and after World War I, new masses of adults had entered the educational and recreational life of the nation, through free associations of their own. By means that are inimical and abhorrent to a free society—by a combination of mass organizational devices, pressure and one-party rule—Strength through Joy was able to overcome inertia or reluctance and thus to attract additional masses. These masses can be supposed to have been strongly impressed by Strength through Joy and by the easy opportunities offered to them. While it is open to question whether they were as firmly won to educational and recreational activities as were those who came as free members of free associations, it is certain that among them many simple people will in Germany's dark days to come look back at Strength through Joy performances as outstanding happy events in their lives. But even with all the pressure and propaganda, many millions stayed outside of Strength through Joy, and many other millions paid only a token attention to its activities. Thus no generalization is possible about the ultimate psychological effects of the organization. And certainly it would be useless to try to predict the currents and cross currents of public opinion which will develop among the German people from the lessons of this war, and which will affect all their thinking about the Hitler regime.

Strength through Joy Nazified recreation. In superseding all other associations working in this field, and destroying their exemplary achievements and their democratic basis, it put an end to the variety and richness of earlier leisure time activities. It annihilated all individual and organizational initiative, condemned the consumer to a completely passive role, and centralized and bureaucratized all recreation under the Nazi party's command. Nazi propaganda was the by-product of all and the main product of many of these activities. Such propaganda, accompanied by an offering of pleasant experiences, may well have

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exercised a stronger and more lasting effect than that produced by purely political propaganda. The lack of active response to the less diluted servings of propaganda is evident, however, from the failure of Nazi adult education.

No quantitative achievements can outweigh the appalling moral and political decay of the German people to which this propagandistic character of Strength through Joy contributed. It is especially deplorable that the high standards of the free labor movement were destroyed and replaced by planned recreational devices saturated with a philosophy of subservience and hatred. This fact would make it extremely perilous to use organizational machinery established by Strength through Joy for future leisure activities. When the time comes, Germany will have to rebuild her leisure activities on an entirely new foundation.

(Institute of World Affairs)

COMMENTARY ON "INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY"

BY ALVIN JOHNSON

THE stars in their courses are *not* fighting for democracy. Marx was wrong in his theory that the law of capitalistic concentration would inevitably bring about a condition in which the proletariat could push the final few overgrown capitalists off their thrones and take over. High capitalism generates a technology of ever-increasing complexity, a technology based not on the exploitation of proletarian manpower but on administrative and engineering efficiency. And this involves the development of a new stratification of society and a more powerful middle class. But democracy is not compatible with social stratification.

Such in a nutshell is the thesis of Professor Eduard Heimann's article on "Industrial Society and Democracy" in the February 1945 issue of *SOCIAL RESEARCH*. No man living has thought more earnestly and profoundly on the problems of democracy than Professor Heimann. I shall not make bold to refute him. But there are some ideas I'd like to add by way of loose commentary.

Of course I agree that it is an error to imagine that any historical process whatever can lead inevitably to the establishment of democracy. American scholars have made much of the potency of free land in the development of American democracy. If free land gave us the democracy of the Middle West, it also gave us the slavery and subsequent racial oppression of the South. Indeed, one may safely say that where land is abundant and accessible to lucrative markets the urge for forced labor is powerful. King Cotton lands demanded slaves, as did the sugar and tobacco lands of Cuba, the hides and tallow of the Argentine pampas. Yet the immense stretches of free land in Australia and New Zealand never compassed forced labor—except in the sugar plantations worked by Kanakas. While New Zealand and Australia were

suited to great sheep ranches operated by fierce overseers and humble shepherd serfs, the natural tendencies encountered friction—the character of the British immigrants.

Because economic forces everywhere encounter non-economic resistances, I'm not prepared to give up hope for democracy, even if the technological trends are as unfavorable as Dr. Heimann argues. But I am not even prepared to admit that the trends are so unfavorable.

Before I can proceed I must try to satisfy myself as to what democracy really is and how it originates. I have to go back to primitive man, but not to Ojibway Indians or the Tierra del Fuegians. The primitiveness of such peoples is a pose and a downright fraud. They have as long an evolution behind them as civilized man, an evolution never interrupted by conquering tyrants, inviable republics, feudalism, absolute monarchy, parliamentary government, capitalism. They have not passed their children through the Moloch fire of the great city and lived on, childless. If I were content with relative primitiveness I'd take, not Trobriand Islanders but Manhattan Islanders. But I want to draw upon absolute primitive man, and he is to be found only among the babies, from birth to the age of loquacity—considered the age of reason—say, eighteen months.

I have to approach this primitive man through homemade psychology, because, alas, there is as yet no other kind.

What do we know of the social-political impulses of this primitive man? There is not a trace of what can be called properly a democratic impulse. Biologists tell me that there wasn't at the outset a democratic chromosome, or even a single democratic gene. Democracy must be a construct. Can we discover what it is made of?

The first requirement of the newborn baby, even ahead of hunger and the exercise of sucking, is the demand for what is later known as security. In the days before the dominance of the trained nurse, with a sanitary Turkish mask over her personal attractiveness, you could press between your hands a thirty-

minutes old baby, indignant over the hardships of life's immigration office, and say, softly, "There, there, my darling." And the wailing would cease, and the multifold wrinkles on the pink brow would smooth out. The little thing knew it was in good, firm hands. Security. I know that. I didn't get it out of books. Therefore I really know it.

The second requirement, which develops much later, is independence, self-activity. At what time in life that appears nobody knows. Parents' observation is too fatuous, and experts' observation too bookish to approach the subtleties of proper timing. All we really know is that the time comes when the child insists "Can, can, can!" about putting on its shoes, when you could slip them on in a jiffy and tote the baby out into the spring air where robin calls to robin, and the song sparrow calls to the Cabots, who are to call to God. And that little thing with its "can, can, can!" and the shoes that take a mortal hour to encase footlessly the little feet that will have to be carried anyway—

The next impulse you note in your primitive man the baby is the impulse toward power. Perhaps this is just a construct from the two I've mentioned. I who suffer from having it applied to me down to this day am inclined to insist that it is primordial. I'm inclined to carp at Voltaire for writing "*Ce que plait aux Femmes*," when he should have written "*Ce que plait aux Hommes*," Power.

When does the urge for power start with our one and only primitive man, the child under eighteen months? Nobody knows. The small philosopher is endowed with the gift of silence, and we adult bandarlog identify intelligence with chatter. But as you walk along the sidewalk, watch the worried mother as the child in little white shoes makes a dive for the horrid puddle and gets there, to hear with deep complacency the outcries of the big stupid person who was taking him somewhere to show him off. Watch him as he slips away to give the big stupid sleeping dog a kick, only to run back to maternal security when the dog says "Woof!" He knows very well that mothers are geese, and that

they can be worked in a thousand ways. Only children see through him. And hundreds of thousands of children recite with gusto the lines of that greatest of child psychologists, Lewis Carroll:

Speak roughly to your little boy,
And beat him when he sneezes.
He only does it to annoy,
Because he knows it teases.

The readers of SOCIAL RESEARCH are by this time very impatient with me and my lore of the true primitive man. I refer them to the greatest teacher the world ever had: "Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings." Out of their mouths I am going to build my conception of democracy.

From his first day to his last, the *homo sapiens*, like a child, asks for security. From very near the first day to the last, he asks for the right to say "Can, can, can." From the 365th day—to put it roughly—he asks for power over the other isolated monads that impinge upon him. And that is all you need, and all you are going to get, to build up democracy.

Someone will say, You've left out the instinct of workmanship. That is implied in "Can, can, can." And if it weren't, I wouldn't admit it. Aller guten Dinge sind drei. Whoever has proposed a Quadrinity? I have presented the Three, and out of that you can make democracy, or it can't be made.

We poor creatures under the sun ask for three things. Give us security, O Lord, let us enjoy the small arc of sunshine from sunrise to sunset without responsibilities that overwhelm us and without obstacles that throw us back with bruised and broken brows. Give us the right, O Lord, to play around in the sunshine, and do our little bit, unconsciously, in Thy great continuing Creation. And give us the power, if it seems good to Thee, to humiliate those who would rule in Thy place, and to exalt our own horns over them. And if it can not be ours to rule, give us Democracy, O Lord.

The bulk of mankind, even today, live under a regime of mixed

security and individual freedom, a regime that may be called democracy. That is true of the masses of China and India, of Java and Sumatra and the other islands of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, of the unexploited parts of Africa, of the Amazon valley. To be sure, there are ruling elements, the Chieftans, the Elders, the medicine men and what not. These are concessions to security, the security of order and tradition. But the individual eats his own bread, or rice, or poi, in the sweat of his own brow, rules his woman or is ruled by her, gets his own children and disciplines them or not, and recognizes nothing royal between himself and the sun who smiles, often too ardently, on all.

The real problem is one of western civilization, the war-stained area from the head of the Persian Gulf to Ultima Thule, now extended beyond to America, where every natural democratic impulse is overshadowed by the need for security.

The early Hebrews of Palestine were getting along fairly in their self-dependent communities with more or less senile Judges settling their problems; but hordes of Egyptians, of Hittites, of Assyrians, made of their land a thoroughfare and a desolation and a waste. And so they cried to Samuel, "Give us a king to lead us against these invading locusts." And Samuel told them what kingship implied, tyranny; but the need for security was overwhelming. Hence Saul as king, the big stiff, but noble, and after him David, whom the Lord loved for reasons peculiar to Himself.

I beg the reader's indulgence for dragging in ancient times. My defense is that all history, from ancient times, exhibits man as sacrificing self-dependence, when necessary, for security. We poor humans had security once, in our mothers' wombs. We need it, and when necessary, will sacrifice everything for it, including independence, and democracy.

Why did men accept the airs and arrogance of the feudal lord? He offered security. Why did they revolt against him? He had abandoned his function as guarantor of security and had transformed himself into a landlord, resident or absentee. The work-

ing peasants, who had kissed his shoes when he gave security in return for his privileges, fell to singing:

When Adam delved and Eva span,
Where was then the gentleman?

Was that merely the English freeman's spirit? On the continent they sang:

Als Adam grub und Eva spann,
Wo war dann der Edelmann?

Either democracy, or security: that alternative is not confined to any one people. It may present itself anywhere, as the circumstances of civil life develop.

If I had unlimited space I would gradually lead up through history to the problem of Germany. But the reader needs no long exposition. He knows that the peoples who held the territory between the Rhine and the Vistula—once Germans, now a conglomerate of Germans, Celts, Wends and Slavs, mixed together after most of the original Germans migrated to England, France, Spain and the Italian Piedmont—have ever been under the menace of hostile invasion from east and west, but down to the nineteenth century particularly from the west. Security was necessarily their first value; security particularly against the imperialist west.

Lieb' Vaterland, magst ruhig sein.
Fest steht und treu die Wacht am Rhein.

"Magst ruhig sein." You may be secure. Take this key: you can open the secrets of German behavior, German policy, even in the most desperate gamble of all history.

The supplying of security is a function that, first of all, satisfies the primitive desire for power. The big boy who takes a little boy under his protection feels enlarged, ennobled, if he does it without seeking further advantage. But what primitive impulse can abide long without leading to exploitation? What was there to prevent the soldiers who supplied security to the German peasants from snitching the peasants' fat hens and pretty daugh-

ters? What could restrain the soldier's contempt for the protectee?

Er gräbt und schaufelt so lang er lebt,
Er gräbt bis er endlich sein Grab sich gräbt.

The protector in the vast areas of village democracy maintains his position only by age, as an Elder, or by magic, as a medicine man. In our complicated western world, where a vast organized group is needed to maintain security, the protecting function is given permanence through an array of habits collectively known to sociologists as "social distance." It was the duty of the German soldier to push the civilian around. Make the lummoX appreciate social distance. It was the duty of the Prussian officer to suspend the civilian officials—to use the Latin expression—on the hook of his high-held nose. It was the duty of von Rundstedt not to recognize socially Hitler, Göring, Goebbels and such cattle. Those lofty Prussian noses have been accepted and admired for generations. They are dragons' teeth of the defenses of German security.

England's security lay in the Channel and the navy. It would have been a sheer impossibility to build up a military caste with the prestige of the Prussians. As for the civilian attitude toward the common soldier:

It's Tommy this and Tommy that, and Tommy, how's your soul?
But it's "Thin red line of heroes" when the drums begin to roll.

It may be slightly irrelevant, but the quotation may be continued a little farther:

We aren't no thin red heroes, nor we aren't no blackguards too,
But single men in barracks most remarkable like you.

Did the feudal and Prussian technique of social distance stop with the army? Certainly not. Social life has no impermeable septa. From the officer caste to the civil official, to the professors, to the businessmen, to the fathers of the families, the social-distance principles established their sway. The structure of German society became truly hierarchical. The result was "order," security in its widest sense, and "discipline," the acceptance of

security at its price. Discipline, not only in the army and the civil service, but throughout society, in industry and the training for industry; in the schools and in the bosom of the family.

And out of that condition we fatuous Americans once expected democracy to rise up full fledged, once we downed the Kaiser.

I hasten to say, I do not despair of German democracy. If it becomes clear to the average German that his security does not hang on the Prussian hooked nose but on an international organization, the whole set-up of social distance will begin to disintegrate. Vestiges of the social-distance-disciplinary order will remain for generations in the vermiform appendix of the social body known in America as "society." We still have in America social-distance-ites whose technique originated with the English Stuarts. They count along with the comics in the phantasmagoria of American life.

I return to the point. Under the force of developing technology are we moving farther and farther away from the conditions most favorable to democracy? Are we becoming more and more hierarchical? Are we becoming more and more definitely stratified socially? Dr. Heimann thinks we are. He may be right. I may be wrong, but I can't agree with him.

Perhaps the reason we can't agree is that we can't understand each other. Dr. Heimann's premises, his terms, his definitions, come out of the complicated economy of social distance hanging upon the hooked nose of the Prussian Junker. Mine come out of American life, devoid of "order," thank God. Dr. Heimann can use the term "bureaucrat" with respect. I can use it only as an insult. There is no other than an insulting meaning in the American terms "bureaucrat" and "bureaucracy." Dr. Heimann can use the term "hierarchy" in good faith. I can use it effectively only as a rabble rouser. Dr. Heimann can take social stratification seriously. I see in American life only functional stratification.

Imagine you are in Detroit, well enough introduced to be taken around the shops by Henry Ford himself. Lunch time has come. Henry takes you into a long barrack with a table for a thousand

sweaty and hungry workers. You and Henry find seats, and the waiters come along shoveling out democratic food without fear or favor. You engage Henry in conversation, which is a big feat. Next to you a man roars, "Pass the mustard!" You've managed to hold Henry's attention, and he fails to hear. "Pass the mustard, for Pete's sake!" You whisper to the sweat-fragrant worker, "This is Henry Ford." "Sure, I know it; ain't he man enough to pass the mustard?"

That is social distance and social stratification at the very heart of American technological capitalism.

At last I invite the reader to join me in some generalizations. American technology is tending, not toward bureaucracy of the European social-distance model, but toward blueprintocracy. We have all noted that the terms "boss," "chief" and such are giving way to "executive." And the executive is the man or woman who executes the blueprint from a higher executive, who executes a blueprint from still higher up. And the worker has his little corner in the blueprint, which he executes, knowing that if he executes it properly he can tell even Henry Ford to go to hell. His personal security is written down in the blueprint. And as reinsurance beyond the blueprint, he has his union, and the Wagner Act.

It is far easier for Hitler to fire von Rundstedt than for Henry Ford to fire Jan Koplecz, who is meeting the requirements of the blueprint.

But Jan does not help make up the blueprint. Who does. God knows. It comes out of the system. The old artisan saddler looked at the horse, looked at his leather, his tools, made up his scheme of workmanship and a saddle that fit the horse—if he was good. There was no production line, with the next lower process crowding in upon him if he slopped, as saddlers always have slopped in order to daydream.

What reader of these lines, besides myself, has ever seen a German saddler stripped to the waist? What a pigeon breast—white meat enough for a large banquet. It was the saddler's

tools and machinery, underneath his skin, which he had to carry around with him, to his drinking bouts, to his church, to his bridal bed. With that monstrous accumulation of white meat he should have had the democratic joy of self-dependence. But white meat on your breast is a discouraging phenomenon. Of all the social cynics and worried husbands, my white-meated German saddler was the type.

The production line does not produce pigeon breasts.

I'm not arguing that modern technology, of itself, produces democracy. I'm only arguing that it represents no insuperable obstacle. I note the problem of social stratification in Russia, but I also note that Russia went wild over Stakhanoff, imitation of accepted American scientific management, American blueprintocracy. Russia, according to Dr. Heimann, takes for executive training the children of fathers who have proved their efficiency. American blueprintocracy recognizes that the growing children of engineers have a lead. Since when was democracy so blind as not to realize that a good part of individual quality comes out of the discipline of childhood, under a mother and father who take their parental job seriously?

Technological progress will not hand us democracy on a silver platter. If we want democracy we have to fight for it. But the fight against the "executives" is nothing as compared with the fight against the hooked Prussian nose and social distance, now smiting the dust on the Rhine.

BOOK REVIEWS

KELSEN, HANS. *Peace through Law*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1944. xii + 155 pp. \$2.

In this eminently interesting little book Dr. Kelsen sums up his proposals for a permanent league for the maintenance of peace, based on the two pillars of compulsory adjudication of international disputes and individual responsibility for violations of international law.

The question of compulsory adjudication or arbitration has been on the agenda of international politics since at least the second Hague Peace Conference, but Dr. Kelsen derives his inspiration not from that source, or from the French Peace Society, "*La Paix par le Droit*," but from his analysis of the League experience. He finds one of the most important causes of the breakdown of the League, perhaps the decisive cause, in the "fatal fault of its construction," that is, in "the fact that the authors of the Covenant placed at the center of this international organization not the Permanent Court of International Justice, but a kind of international government, the Council of the League of Nations." Relying upon this diagnosis he advocates that the constitution of the new permanent league should establish, as its main organ, an international court with compulsory jurisdiction. The four great powers, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China, should guarantee observance of the covenant and, in particular, of the decisions of the court. Their power should be "employed not at the order of a political body but in execution of the decision of the court." In this manner the members of the organization would be assured that the overwhelming power of the Big Four could be exercised only for the maintenance of the law. Protection of the territorial integrity and political independence of member states against external aggression should be entrusted to political alliances and not to the organization as such.

The plea for compulsory adjudication is further based on the ground that it does not change the fundamental structure of international relations, that it is based on majority decisions, that it develops international law by applying its rules and principles to concrete cases, that it applies justice and equity, and, finally, that it is impartial. Dr. Kelsen rejects as unsound and unfounded the distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable disputes and the doctrine of the insufficiency of international law. In his view a dispute between states can always be decided on the basis of international law. To limit the jurisdiction of the court to legal disputes would

be tantamount to authorizing "the parties to the conflict to withdraw any conflict from the jurisdiction of the tribunal whenever the party considers the application of the law to the conflict to be unsatisfactory."

Dr. Kelsen's proposal for the "enactment of rules establishing individual responsibility of the persons who as members of government have violated international law by resorting to or provoking war" is founded on the assumption that the principle of *bellum justum* forms part of positive international law. It is further founded on the assumption that international law can and does obligate individuals directly. He is not unaware of the fact that both these propositions are far from being generally admitted. He argues, nevertheless, that "there is no reason to renounce a criminal charge made against the persons morally responsible for the outbreak of World War II." Individuals responsible for ordinary war crimes, however, cannot be punished without the consent of the state concerned, as these crimes were mostly committed as "acts of state." To overcome

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this difficulty Dr. Kelsen suggests that the necessary consent should be obtained by the United Nations, by treaty.

Those who are in favor of compulsory adjudication of international disputes, and of punishing war criminals, will find substantial arguments in this book for continuing their struggle for an improved system of international relations. It seems doubtful, however, that Dr. Kelsen's theses will prove persuasive enough to reverse the current trend in international politics, which favors a distinction between legal and political disputes and places a political rather than a judicial body in the center of the future international organization.

LEO GROSS

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

KRZESINSKI, ANDREW J. *Is Modern Culture Doomed?* New York: Devin-Adair. 1942. 176 pp. \$2.

Recent years have seen the publication of a rather large number of books, from the pens of Catholic and also Protestant divines,

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stating that the modern world is going to the dogs. The responsibility for this unhappy state of world affairs is usually laid on modern culture, and the explanation of its pernicious influence is triumphantly discovered in the irreligious or even anti-religious character of our period. The explanation clearly points to the remedy: back to the teaching of the Church.

Father Krzesinski is not so pessimistic as most writers of this type. He, too, condemns modern culture for its materialism, paints a gloomy picture of the misery of modern man, who has turned away from God in his absurd pursuit of worldly happiness, and opposes to this picture the radiant joy and deep contentment of the life inspired by faith. He recognizes, however, that not all is to be condemned in the materialistic trend of the modern world: the alleviation of poverty, the betterment of the living conditions of the masses, are in his opinion positive achievements. Still, without God, all that is dust and ashes. But Father Krzesinski does not despair, because he finds in the modern world, in spite of its prevailing

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materialism, a deep Christian trend. Christian culture is not dead; its light shines in the darkness and its truth asserts itself with a growing strength.

Now it is obvious that a civilization which could not prevent the unholy mess in which the world has found itself in the twentieth century is a sick civilization. It is therefore very easy to criticize it, and, as a matter of fact, Father Krzesinski's criticisms are often witty, and even justified and pertinent. Yet his conclusions seem to be wholly gratuitous, and his proposed remedy illusory. Faith has never prevented wars, or hate, or even cruelty. Quite the contrary: it is the epochs which had the deepest concern about the salvation of man's eternal soul that were also the least concerned about his terrestrial and temporal destiny. Humanitarianism is a product not of faith, but of the secularization of faith. Moreover, people believe in God, or don't. You cannot promote faith by showing that it is a good means to save culture—even if it were true.

ALEXANDRE KOYRÉ

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